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A LOOK AT TITLE VII's
REGULATORY REGIME
RONALD TURNER

*

INTRODucnON

At a recent judicial conference, televised by C-SPAN, a panel
of jurists discussed the problem of the burgeoning case load facing
the federal courts! and possible responses to that problem. One
panelist called for the creation of Article I courts2 and the use of
administrative agencies to handle and decide certain cases, thus
freeing the Article III judiciary3 to concentrate on the "important"
cases (e.g., antitrust, securities, etc.). When asked to identify the
type of cases that fell outside the "important" case category, Judge
Stanley Sporkin identified social security cases and actions brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").4

* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law; J.D.,
1984, The University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Magna Cum Laude, 1980, Wil
berforce University. I acknowledge and wish to thank Dean Kenneth C. Randall and
the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for supporting my research leading
to this and other works. I also acknowledge the ongoing patience, support, and encour
agement of my spouse and best friend, Karen Faye Thmer.
1. On the federal courts' burgeoning caseload, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (Congress shall have the power "[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"). The Tax Court is an example of an Article I
court. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDI
CIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 247 (1990); POSNER, supra note 1, at 26.
3. Article III of the Constitution provides that:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu
ance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "Article III defines not only the judicial power of the United
States but who may exercise it: judges who have lifetime tenure and are guaranteed
against any reduction in salary." POSNER, supra note 1, at 25-26.
In addition to Article I and Article III courts and judges, there are thousands of
non-Article III federal judges, including administrative law judges, military judges, and
federal magistrates. [d. at 26.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For Judge Sporkin's
views on this subject, see Stanley Sporkin, Reforming The Federal Judiciary, 46 SMU L.
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I am troubled by the view that Title VII cases are not as impor
tant as cases arising under other federal statutes, and I am con
cerned that acceptance of that view could relegate Title VII to a
subordinate status. In enacting Title VII, Congress declared that
the federal courts have jurisdiction over actions alleging conduct
prohibited by that statute, that individuals who have been aggrieved
by certain discriminatory practices have rights and remedies, and
that one significant aspect of this nation's myriad laws and public
policies is the prohibition of discriminatory conduct in the
workplace.
On the Monday following my viewing of the conference, I
made my way to work in a downtown Chicago law firm. Riding the
El, I noticed that virtually all of the booth agents, conductors, driv
ers, and maintenance personnel were African-Americans. Stopping
off in a fast food restaurant to purchase a breakfast sandwich, I ob
served that all of the workers behind the counter were African
Americans. When I arrived at work and stopped off in the mail
room to pick up legal pads and sundry supplies, I saw what I had
seen before and obviously knew-that virtually all of the mail room
personnel were African-Americans. But a different picture
emerged when I looked at the racial composition of the firm's law
yers; of the hun<;lreds of lawyers in the firm, the number of African
American attorneys could be counted on one hand (without using
all of the fingers on that hand).
What accounted for the high level of African-American partici
pation and representation in the transportation, fast food, and mail
room jobs and the low level of representation in the ranks of the
law firm's attorneys? Were these representation levels reflective
and indicative of the historical and ongoing reality of occupational
stratification in the nation's workplaces?5 What role does (or
should) Title VII play in addressing such stratification?
As we mark the thirtieth anniversary of the enactment of Title
VII, it is both timely and appropriate to take another look at the
statute and its use. In this Article, I argue that, given the extant
definitions of "discrimination" violative of Title VII and the gov
erning concepts and principles pertinent to Title VII litigation, the
statute, as currently interpreted, administered, and enforced, can
not have a substantial impact on the equal employment rights and
REv. 751, 757 (1992) (stating that cases involving TItle VII and other federal statutes
are overloading the federal court system).
5. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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opportunities of many in the African-American6 community7 who
are its intended beneficiaries. In making this point, I do not con
tend that Title VII has been completely ineffective relative to the
employment opportunities of African-Americans. I do contend
that an assessment of the real world impact of the statute reveals
that Title VII's purposes and aspirations are riot being met, perhaps
cannot be fully met, and that absent a change in the approach to,
and analysis of, antidiscrimination law, the impact of Title VII will
continue to be limited.
Given that view, it is time to take another look at the assump
tions that have become ingrained in our thinking, understanding,
and expectations regarding the purpose and application of Title
VII. As discussed below,8 our current conception of actionable
"discrimination" must expand beyonq the "I fired (or did not hire,
or did not promote) her because she is black" paradigm. Few are
the employers who are unsophisticated or brazen enough in this day
and age to engage in such overt discrimination. Instead, present
6. While my focus here is on the impact of Title VII's regulatory regime on Afri
can-Americans, I recognize that other groups in America (women, African-American
women, Latinos, Native Americans, and other people of color) have been and are sub
jected to discrimination. While it can be argued with some force that a focus on Afri
can-Americans does not and cannot address the question of discrimination in all its
forms and dimensions, I have chosen to focus on African-Americans, knowing that the
analysis and discussion may not fully apply to all groups protected by Title VII. See
Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies
for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1674-75 (1991)
(suggesting that discrimination should not be discussed exclusively as an African-Amer
ican problem).
7. In using the term "community," I recognize that the African-American com
munity is not a monolithic entity. "[T]here has never been a monolithic black commu
nity or even a myth of one-ask Elijah Muhammad and Martin Luther King, Jr., or Dr.
Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, and Marcus Garvey." Michael Thelwell, False, Fleet
ing, Perjured Clarence: Yale's Brightest and Blackest Go to Washington, in RACE-lNG,
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 86, 94-95 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). "[W]hat
there has been is massive and close agreement at the center." Id. at 95. See Anthony
Cook, Critical Race Law and Affirmative Action: The Legacy of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., 8 HARV. BLACKLElTER J. 61, 73 (1991); see also Toni Morrison, Introduction:
Friday on the Potomac, in RACE-lNG, JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY vii,
xxx (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) ("It is clear to the most reductionist intellect that black
people think differently fr()m one another; it is also clear that the time for undis
criminating racial unity has passed."); Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its
Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1817 (1992) (ar
guing that the black community is now more of an idea or ideal than a reality; while
"the ubiquitous experience of racism provides the basis for group solidarity, differences
of gender, class, geography, and political affiliations keep blacks apart").
8. See infra notes 130-257 and accompanying text.
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and future discussions of Title VII and discrimination in the work
place must recognize and take account of the realities of subordina
tion, subjugation, racial stratification, and the real world deficits in
many African-Americans' exposure to and acquisition of human
capital and job skills-realities shaped by and flowing from past
and present discrimination. We must ask" 'how does race alter the
contours of legal reality?"'9 It is also imperative that we under
stand that the efficacy of antidiscrimination laws and the legal doc
trines interpreting and applying those laws will be affected by other
"people's policies"lo that generally shape the skill, dexterity, and
judgment of those individuals comprising and participating in the
labor pool.
This discussion will proceed as follows. Part I provides an
overview of specific and significant events in the history of race and
the law.ll Part II discusses the provisions of, and the procedures set
forth in, Title VII and examines the way the statute is currently
used in the workplace. In Part II, I discuss the view that the statute
is now principally used to protect the rights of incumbent employ
ees who allege that their employer has engaged in discriminatory
conduct. While such use of Title VII is important, the protection of
incumbent employees does not promote an acknowledged purpose
of the statute-the opening of employment opportunities to Afri
can-Americans (and other groups). The prevailing use of Title VII
falls far short of that statutory purpose.12 Part III addresses a "less
9. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 966 (1993).
10. John T. Dunlop, To Form a More Perfect Union, 9 LAB. LAW. 1 (1993). As
stated by Professor Dunlop:
By "people's policies" is meant the following measures taken in combination
that generally shape the "skill, dexterity and judgment" of labor that is ap
plied: (1) primary and secondary education; (2) training and retraining; (3)
health care; (4) family policies; (5) housing policies; (6) management methods
in applying the labor force at the workplace; (7) relations between manage
ment and labor organizations; and (8) the quality of public service and govern
ment regulations as they relate to the work force. The list could be extended
to include criminal justice, environment, economic development and a number
of other topics ....
Id. at 1-2.
11. Again, my focus here is more specifically on African-Americans, the regula
tory regime of Title VII, and the application of that statute to discrimination in the
workplace.
12. See George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REv. 1463,
1479 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992»; see also infra notes 102-29 and
accompanying text.
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familiar conceptual question-what do we mean by
discrimination?"13
Part IV then examines and critiques two recent works which
noted the ineffectiveness of antidiscrimination law and proposed
provocative changes in the legal approach to discrimination. Pro
fessor David Strauss has proposed that every firm be required to
employ minoriti~s in proportion to their percentage in the national
popUlation, and that employers who do not comply with this re
quirement be sanctioned by fines. 14 Professor Derrick Bell's most
recent book discusses a "Racial Preference Licensing Act." Under
that act, employers and others could obtain a license authorizing
the license holder to exclude or separate persons on the basis of
color if the holder paid "to a government commission a tax of
[three] percent of the income derived from whites employed, whites
served, or products sold to whites."15 Finally, I conclude that the
current regime of Title VII, with its dependence on litigation and
judicial interpretation, will have a limited impact with respect to
increasing the employment and employment opportunities of Afri
can-Americans.
I.

RACE AND THE LAW

The "problem of the color line"16 has been and continues to be
one of the most pressing issues facing this natioriP Beginning in
August 1619 (when John Rolfe wrote into the journal of James
town, Virginia: "about the last of August, there came to Virginia a 
Dutchman of Warre that sold us twenty negers"),18 the presence of
13. Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1157, 1159 (1991).
14. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991).
15. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 48 (1992).
16. W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES 23
(Faucett Publications, Inc. 1961) (1953); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE: LEG
ACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (1993); JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A.
Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (6th ed. 1988).
17. If one somehow forgets the presence and reality of racism in this country, a
reminder is sure to come in the form of a racial epithet, the denial of a promotion,
incidents of racial harassment, or the savage beating of an African-American (Rodney
King and many others) and the resulting riots.
18. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Looking for God
and Racism in All the Wrong Places, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 191, 193 (1993); see A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 20 (1978); Bryan K. Fair, Foreword: Re
thinking the Colorblindness Model, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 13 (1993).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

224

[Vol. 16:219

individuals who are black ("them") on the soil of America ("our")
and in the midst of whites ("us") raised fundamental questions rela
tive to notions of equality, rights, antidiscrimination principles, and
the like.
Throughout the history of this nation, the "problem of the
color line" has arisen in various forms and contexts and has been
accompanied by a corresponding set of assumptions and myths con
structed by those in power to justify the subordination of blacks.
Even though the Declaration of Independence declared, "[w]e hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,"19
the author of that document, Thomas Jefferson, owned approxi
mately 175 slaves. 2o
Ten provisions in the original Constitution (which did not ex
plicitly refer to slavery or race )21 directly or indirectly dealt with
slavery.22 The Constitution prohibited any congressional interfer
ence with the slave trade before 1808,23 and blacks were described
as "other persons"-to be considered three-fifths of a human be
ing-in that most revered document.24 The "peculiar institution" of
19.
20.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal
Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1018 (1993). Jefferson did liberate eight
slaves during his lifetime. Those persons freed were the children and grandchildren of
his father-in-law, John Wayles. Id. at n.66 (citing Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery:
"Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 181,204-07 (Pe
ter S. Onuf ed., 1993».
21. I use the term "race" because that term is commonly used in discussions of
discrimination, and for the sake of convenience and familiarity. I note, however, that
the term "race" is a modern European construct, (see CORNEL WEST, KEEPING FAITH:
PHILOSOPHY AND RACE IN AMERICA xii (1993», and "that there is only one biological
race and that is the human race." Darlene Clark Hine, "In The Kingdom of Culture":
Black Women and the Intersection of Race, Gender, and Class, in LURE AND LoATHING:
ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY, AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILATION 337, 338 (Ger
ald Early ed., 1993). The use of the word "race" in this culture actually refers to the
"social construction of differences. Race, class, and gender are not only the only factors
that shape identity, but they are, even more to the point, potent indicators of an individ
ual's relation to power." Id. at 339.
22. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE 3 (1987); DONALD E. LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE 4-5
(1992); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA: 1760-184862-63 (1977).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 1.
24. See id. at § 2, cl. 3; LIVELY, supra note 22. See generally ROBERT A.
GOLDWIN, WHY BLACKS, WOMEN, AND JEWS ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE CONSTITU
TION, AND OTHER UNORTHODOX VIEWS (1990).
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American slavery25 was justified by paternlllism26 and by a racialist
theory of congenital inferiority which posited that blacks were ge
netically and intellectually inferior to whites27 and. were "the less
than human negro."28 This "mytho-narrative"29 view of African in
feriority was not based on nor defended by "science" or a "philo
sophical case for the innate moral and intellectual inferiority of the
black race."30 The view of African-American inferiority pre-dated
the founding of this nation, shivery, and American apartheid. 31
Black persons were treated as non-humans under the law. 32 In
1857, the Supreme Court of the United States held that blacks were
property and were not citizens under the Constitution. 33 Indeed,
stated the Court, blacks had been "regarded as beings of an inferior
order ... altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations ... and ... they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect."34 And since the Civil War was
fought to preserve the Union and not to free the slaves,35 the equal
25. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956).
.
26. See William W. Fisher III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1051 (1993). The paternalist theory, which I reject, depicted South
ern society
.
as a whole as patriarchal and humane. Social and economic relations in the
region, so the argument went, are vertical and reciprocal. Inferiors obey and
respect their superiors and are rewarded with support and sustenance. Slavery
is just one component (albeit an important component) of this essentially feu
dal system. Masters enjoy the labor and obedience of their slaves, but provide
them in return food, housing, moral and religious guidance, and care in their
infancy and old age. The net result is a stable, familial, and mutually beneficial
labor system-which contrasts favorably with the brutal and tumultuous wage
labor system used in the industrializing North.
Id. at 1065 (footnote omitted).
27. See BELL, supra note 22, at 156; DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 11 (1980); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED Es
SAYS 1938-1988325 (1989); STAMPP, supra note 25, at 197-236; Fisher, supra note 26, at
1066.
28. Higginbotham & Francois, supra note 18, at 193.
29. Reginald L. Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the Violent
Discourse Between Korean and African-Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 15, 18 n.4 (1993)
(citing ERNST CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTIi 3-4 (Susanne K. Lenger trans., 1953)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39,78.
33. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857).
34. [d. at 407; see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTf CASE: ITS SIGNIFI·
CANCE IN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).
35. As stated by President Lincoln: "My paramount object in this struggle is to
save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union
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ity and liberty of blacks was not the animating force in that conflict.
During the First Reconstruction (the period between 1863 and
1877),36 the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
were added to the Constitution,37 and Congress enacted civil rights
legislation. But the First Reconstruction was unable to survive the
politics of that time, and the Supreme Court invalidated the early
civil rights laws. 38 The First Reconstruction was ended by the Black
Codes in the southern states39 and by the Supreme Court's endorse
ment of the separate but equal doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson,40
wherein the Court constitutionalized American apartheid. 41 Law
ful and constitutional segregation was justified by those imposing it
on blacks by the myth of the "happy and contented negro."42
The Second Reconstruction (which commenced in either 1945
or 1954 and ended at some point during the period between 1976
and 1989),43 was a period of many significant developments. The
without freeing any slave I would do it." See Arthur S. Miller, Pretense and Our Two
Constitutions, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 388 n.48 (1986) (quoting letter from Abra
ham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862), reprinted in 5 COLLEcrED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 388 (R. Basler ed., 1953» (emphasis omitted).
36. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877 (1988). The term "reconstruction, in the civil rights context, is a short-hand
description of the legal, political, and social efforts to eliminate slavery and the racist
legacy of slavery captured in the Dred Scott philosophy." Robert Belton, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and the Future of Affirmative Action: A Preliminary Assessment, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1992).
37. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
38. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed.
1974); Belton, supra note 36, at 1093.
39. See HAROLD HYMAN & WILLIAM WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 315
19 (1982).
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. The Plessy Court stated:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political
rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.
Id. at 551-52.
42. Higginbotham & Francois, supra note 18, at 193.
43. The Second Reconstruction commenced in either 1945, or in 1954, the year
the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See
MANNING MARABLE, RACE REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUC
TION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990 (1991). The Second Reconstruction ended at
some point between 1976 and 1989. See Belton, supra note 36, at 1095. The argument
for 1989 as the ending date for the Second Reconstruction is based on the Supreme
Court's 1988 Term, wherein the Court ruled against plaintiffs in a number of civil rights
and employment discrimination cases. See Mark S. Brodin, Reflection on the Supreme
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defeat of the racial superiority principle of the Nazis in World War
II and the "revelations of Nazi atrocities created a more sympa
thetic environment for minority organizations and others who had
long challenged racial discrimination in the United States."44 But
African-American soldiers returned to the United States after fight
ing and risking their lives for their country to find continuing dis
crimination and violent, rascist attacks in the South. 45
However, in the competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union for the minds and allegiances of the Third World,
American efforts to address discrimination within its borders pro
vided this country with credibility in that ideological struggle. 46
Rosa Parks refused to move to the back of the bus,47 the civil rights
movement gained momentum,48 and the Supreme Court decided
Brown v. Board of Education,49 overturning, at least as a matter of
law, the doctrine of separate but equal.
Any discussion of discrimination on the basis of race, including
this discussion of Title VII, must take account of the incontrovert
ible facts of two hundred and fifty years of slavery, eighty years of
legally enforced subordination of African-Americans, and past and
present social norms that have kept African-Americans "in the low
est status, least remunerative jobs, and [have] denied them the
chance to move up the occupational ladder."50 A very large
number of African-Americans "still suffer from the tragic sequelae
of Plessy."51 The consequences of the history and the reality of ra
cism are manifest; many African-Americans face ever worsening
poverty, unemployment, serious illness, drug addiction, decreasing
Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of
the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1 (1989).
44. ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 40 (1993).
45. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Conver
gence Dilemma, 93 fuRV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980).
46. Id.; see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 61 (1988).
47. "I had decided that 1 would have to know once and for all what rights 1 had as
a human being and a citizen." See JAMES M. BURNS, THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT:
THE CROSSWINDS OF FREEDOM 348-49 (1990) (quoting Rosa Parks).
48. Repression of the civil rights movement was rationalized with the myth of the
"violent and communist negro." Higginbotham & Francois, supra note 18, at 193.
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
50. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv.
1060, 1073 (1991).
51. Robinson, supra note 29, at 47 (quoting A. Leon Higginbotham, An Open
Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1000, 1010 (1992».
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life expectancy, increasing homicide rates, crime, incarceration, in
fant mortality, housing, toxic and hazardous environments, re
stricted access to mortgages and financing, and inadequate
education.52
This last subject, education, is of particular importance to the
issue of employment. The gap between the college attendance rates
of blacks and whites has grown since 1980, the quality of schools
attended by African-Americans has declined, and segregation has
denied many blacks access to· quality schools and valuable influ
ences. 53 "As a consequence, great numbers of blacks are prepared
neither for college nor for the labor market. It seems likely that
black wages will continue to lag behind white wages as long as black
schooling lags behind white schooling."54 To the extent that racial
segregation or under-representation in the work force continues,
they will "evoke strong images of an earlier racial hierarchy . . .
[and can] ignite latent racism in some whites, particularly the young
or inexperienced. "55
Can the law adequately address and rectify the consequences
and ravages of de jure and de facto discrimination and subordina
tion? More specifically, can federal employment discrimination law
and public policy make or facilitate changes in the workplace which
will address the status quo, and deter or remedy unlawful
discrimination?
II.

TITLE

VII

The problem of the color line and the debate over the meaning
of equality have important implications for the workplace.
Most of us work in order to live, and our standard of living and
sense of self-worth are determined by the work we are able to do.
Anything which limits employment options, whether by restrict
ing our opportunities or expanding someone else's at our ex
pense, is a matter of ~eep concern.56
52. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT 121 (1993); Adeno
Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2253,2256-57 (1993); Richard Delgado, Zero
Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on Behalf of the
Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEO. L.J. 1929 (1990).
53. Nan L. Maxwell, The Effect On Black-White Wage Differences of Differences
in the Quantity and Quality of Education, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 249 (1994).
54. Id.
Addis,

Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 49 (1990).
Steven R. Greenberger, A Profluctivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,72 OR. L. REV. 253,255 (1993); see also ELLIS COSE, THE
RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS: WHY ARE .MIDDLE-CLASS BLACKS ANGRY? WHY

55.
56.
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Pre- Title VII Social Indicators

The deteriorating economic well-being of African-Americans
dl:1fing the 1940s and 1950s (and, of course, in the period before and
after those two decades) is a real, indisputabie;and unfortunate fact
of life. African-Americans did not share in this nation's post-World
War II economic surge,57 and were disproportionately laid off or
demoted after the end of that war. 58 By 1958, black unemployment
had reached double. digits and was generally double the rate of
white unemployment. 59 Deputy Secretary of Labor W. Willard
Wirtz testified before congressional committees that the American
work force was not employed efficiently or democratically; that in
the years immediately following World War II the black unemploy
ment rate was approximately sixty percent higher than the white
unemployment rate; that in June 1963, the official white and black
unemployment rates were 5.1 % and 11.2%, respectively; and that
black workers were increasingly vulnerable in an economy that was
moving toward a technical and service-oriented base. 60 In the sum
mer of 1963, the federal Census Bureau released a study showing
that black income was approximately fifty-five percent of white in
come; that in most states non-white males had the same occupa
tional distribution relative to whites that the non-whites had in 1940
and 1950; and that in the South the earnings of non-whites were
only one-third of those of whites with similar jobs and schooling. 61
B.

The Enactment of Title VII

On July 2, 1964, Congress enacted many civil rights laws, in
cluding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act").62
SHOULD AMERICA CARE 55 (1993) (the continuing relevance of race takes on special
force in the workplace "partly because so much of life ... is defined by work").
57. HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RICaITS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 100 (1990).
58. Robinson, supra note 29, at 43 n.99.
59. Id. at 43 n.98.
60. Id. at 101; see Hearings, Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 443-57 (June 6, 1963) (Testimony of Secre
tary W. Willard Wirtz).
61. GRAHAM, supra note 57, at 101; Hearings, Subcommittee on Employment and
Manpower, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 321
88 (July 31, 1963) (Testimony of Herman P. Miller).
62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at various
sections of the United States Code). For discussion of the events leading to the enact
ment of the Act, and particularly Title VII, see BLUMROSEN, supra note 44, at 40-52;
PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL
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"[T]he plight of the Negro in our economy"63 was one of Con
gress' primary concerns. As stated by one senator, "[t]he rate of
Negro unemployment has gone up consistently as compared with
white unemployment for the past [fifteen] years. This is a social
malaise and a social situation which we should not tolerate. That
is one of the principal reasons why the bill should pass."64

Senator Humphrey, a key supporter of the Act, stated that the crux
of the problem of discrimination was to open employment opportu
nities for blacks in occupations traditionally closed to them, "and it
was to this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial dis
crimination in employment was primarily addressed."65
Title VII66 has been described as one of the most significant
pieces of civil rights legislation ever enacted by Congress. 67 One
section of Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, beEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN lHE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1985);
GRAHAM, supra note 57.
63. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,202 (1979) (quoting 110 CONGo
REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey».
64. Id. (quoting 110 CONGo REC. 7220 (statement of Sen. Clark».
65. Id. at 203; see 110 CONGo REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); see
also Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. V. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986)
("Congress enacted Title VII based on its determination that racial minorities were
subject to pervasive and systematic discrimination in employment."); CHRISTOPHER
JENCKS, RElHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND lHE UNDERCLASS 3-4
(1992) ("[T]he provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that barred racial discrimina
tion in employment were also meant to help equalize economic opportunity."); Ruther
glen, supra note 12, at 1465 (The laws against employment discrimination "were
designed to open jobs to groups excluded from them.").
66. See generally BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIS·
CRIMINATION LAW 933-1185 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing various aspects of Title VII
litigation).
67. Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 921 (1993); Hubert H. Humphrey, Preface to the First Decade of
Title VIl of the Civil Rights Act: Past Developments and Future Trends, 20 ST. LoUiS U.
L.J. 219 (1976) (commemorating the tenth anniversary of Title VII).
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cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na
tional origin.68

Title VII also created an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission").69 The Commission is
composed of five members, appointed by the President with the ad
vice and consent of the Senate, for a term of five years. The Presi
dent designates one commissioner to serve as the chairman and one
member to serve as the vice chairman. The President also appoints,
again with the advice and consent of the Senate, a general counsel
who serves a four-year term and has responsibility for the conduct
of litigation. 70 Declining to grant cease and desist authority to the
EEOC, Congress decided that the federal courts would be responsi
ble for enforcement of Title VII.71 However, Title VII does em
power the EEOC to prevent any person from engaging in specified
unlawful employment practices. 72
When a charge of unlawful discrimination is filed with the
EEOC by or on behalf of an aggrieved person alleging that an em
ployer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the EEOC
serves notice of the charge on the respondent and investigates the
matter. 73 If the EEOC determines that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, the EEOC "shall endeavor to elimi
nate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."74 On aver
age, the time required for the investigation of a charge and the rea
sonable cause determination is 280 days, with another 255 days for
conciliation efforts to obtain voluntary compliance and settlement
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). TItle VII also prohibits discrimination by em
ployment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)
(d) (1988).
69. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4(a) (1988).
70. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4(a), (b) (1988).
71. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974); Belton, supra
note 67, at 921-22. The 1972 amendments to TItle VII authorized the EEOC to seek
judicial enforcement of the statute. Id. at 922; 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(c) (1988).
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for the language of 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1988).
73. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
[T]he [EEOC] or its designated representative shall at all reasonable times
have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any
evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to
unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to
the charge under investigatioI)..
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988). The EEOC also has the power to issue subpoenas. 42
U.S.c. § 2000e-9 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (1993).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
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in reasonable cause determinations.75 If the Commission is unable
to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer,
the general counsel determines whether to recommend to the Com
mission that a civil action be brought against the employer (a pro
cess which takes approximately (orty days). The Commission will
then take another forty days to decide whether the matter should
be litigated in federal court. 76 The EEOC may bring a civil action
against the employer in the appropriate district court,77 and the ag
grieved party has the right to intervene in the action. 78 "Thus, the
average case spans more than 600 days from the filing of the charge
until the case is referred to the General Counsel to prepare to bring
suit. This is the average processing time; some stages may take
twice as long. "79
If, after the investigation, the EEOC determines that there is
not reasonable cause to believe that the charge has merit,80 it "shall
dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to be
aggrieved and the respondent of its action."81 The matter may not
end there, however, as EEOC enforcement of Title VII is not exclu
sive. A charging party may bring a civil action in federal court once
a charge is dismissed. In addition, if the EEOC has not filed a civil
action within 180 days from the filing of the charge or has not com
75. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457,480-81 (1992).
76. Id.
77. During the debate on' the 1972 amendments to Title VII, conservative and
liberal members of Congress differed on the question whether Title VII should be en
forced by EEOC court actions or by cease-and-desist orders like those issued by the
National Labor Relations Board and enforced by the federal courts of appeals. See
WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 41 (1977). Proponents of EEOC court action urged, inter alia, that
enforcement of Title VII could be sabotaged by the presidential appointment of unsym
pathetic and politically motivated commissioners. Id. Proponents of the cease-and
desist method argued, inter alia, that the expertise of the commissioners would be
greater than that of the court, and that the commissioners would be more sympathetic
to claimants. Id.
The 1972 amendments empowered the EEOC to pursue federal court actions, and
also provided that individual plaintiffs have the right to sue if the EEOC dismissed their
charge or took no action in their case. Id.
78. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
79. Summers, supra note 75, at 481 (footnote omitted).
80. Reasonable cause findings are issued in less than five percent of all Title VII
charges filed with the EEOC. Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The
Court at the Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981 and tlie Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY
L.J. 949, 988-89 & nn.153-54 (1988).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
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pleted its investigation or filed a civil action,82 an aggrieved party
may file a civil action. 83
A Title VII plaintiff complaining of intentional discrimination
may request a trial by jury and may seek punitive and compensa
tory damages. 84 Where a court finds that an employer has engaged
in an unlawful employment practice, the court may enjoin the em
ployer "from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate," including re
instatement of employees or hiring of applicants with or without
back pay, or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri
ate. 85 In addition, a court may allow the prevailing party86 attor
neys' fees (including expert fees) as part of costS.87
C.

The Impact of Title VII

There is general agreement that Title VII had a definite impact
on the nation's workplaces in the decade immediately following its
enactment.88 Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
employers eliminated many longstanding employment practices
that had limited opportunities for African-Americans and other mi
norities, and the relative income of black workers began to rise
82. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 66, at 946-47,1168; Summers, supra note 75,
at 481.
.
83. It should also be noted that Congress gave EEOC commissioners the power
to file their own discrimination charges, as well as the power to file charges challenging
a pattern or practice of discrimination. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-5(b),-6(e) (1988).
84. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(a), (c) (Supp. IV 1992). The sum of compensatory and pu
nitive damages are limited based on the size of the employer. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3)
(Supp. IV 1992).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1988). Backpay liability cannot accrue from a date
more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earn
ings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discrimi
nated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. [d.
86. The law excludes the Commission and the United States from this provision.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
87. [d.
88. See John Bound & Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Progress: Erosion
of the Post-1965 Gain in the 1980's?, in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 32 (Steven Shulman & William Darity, Jr.,
eds., 1989); John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1603 (1991); James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Im
pact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of
South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 138 (1989).
For a different view, see James Smith & Finis Welch, Black Economic Progress
after Myrdal, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 519 (1989) (education and migration were the
primary determinants of long-term black economic improvement).
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sharply.89 Even Professor Richard Epstein (no fan of Title VII)90
acknowledges that a substantial increase in black participation in
the labor force "followed quickly on the heels of the introduction of
Title VII."91 Accrding to Epstein:
Virtually all of that increase [in black participation] is attributa
ble to the removal of formal barriers to entry, both public and
private. The early enforcement efforts were relatively easy. Fed
eral officials took on the most obvious targets which offered the
greatest civil rights gains through direct administrative attacks on
explicit discriminatory practices, public and private. Here the il
legality of the conduct was so patent that most firms would desist
without a real fight, seeing that it was one they could not win ....
Large employers ... whose formal rules were in violation of Title
VII were the first to comply, for they offered big targets and had
the resources to pay any fines and back pay orders that might be
entered against them.92

Professor Fran Ansley has pointed out that after the passage of
Title VII, "traditionally excluded groups obtained relief in broad,
aggressive litigation that for a time characterized the new era of
antidiscrimination law."93 But, Professor Ansley notes, "the scale
of overall progress made, and the amount of race and gender strati
fication still remaining are both serious disappointments."94
While Title VII had a positive impact on the employment pros
pects of some African-Americans, and has been effective to the ex
tent that employers no longer openly admit to excluding African
Americans, women, and other people of color in the manner and to
the degree they did prior to Title VII,95 racial stratification in the
nation's workplaces continued and continues to exist today. Afri
can-Americans are over-represented in certain occupations (includ
89. Black earnings and wages relative to white earnings and wages increased be
ginning in the mid-1960s, with the South experiencing the greatest African-American
advance during the period 1960-1970. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 88, at 1606.
90. See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EM
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS] (chal
lenging the accepted basis for, and advcating the repeal of, employment
antidiscrimination laws); Richard A. Epstein, Should Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 Be Repealed?, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 349 (1993) (same).
91. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 90, at 252.
92. Id.
93. Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1759 n.7 (1993).
94. Id. at 1760 n.7.
95. See generally John J. Donohue III, The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy
on the Economic Status of Blacks, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 41 (1991).
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ing nursing aides, orderlies, bus drivers, and correctional officers )96
and are under-represented in others (including engineering, law,
medicine, architecture, journalism, and waiters).97
African-American rates of unemployment have historically
been much higher, and labor-force participation lower, than the
white rates of unemployment and labor-force participation.98 Many
inner-city black males suffer from long-term joblessness. "An in
ner-city man may be jobless for a long time because he is pro
foundly discouraged about his employment prospects, or because
he is dissatisfied with the quality of jobs he thinks he can get, or
because he supports himself with illegal activities."99 African
American males also experience unemployment on a frequent
basis.loo
The critical point is that the presence or absence of African
Americans in certain offices, businesses, and occupations is viewed
as, and therefore becomes, "normal" in the sense that it is accepted
and perhaps even expected by society. We should worry that the
daily experiences of African-Americans, other people of color, and
whites convey the message that African-Americans "belong" in cer
tain so-called "lower level" positions, and that they do not or can
not hold the so-called "higher level" jobs and occupations. Can
Title VII address, provide a remedy for, and change the stubborn
reality of occupational stratification?lOl In pondering that question,
96. African-Americans, who constitute 10.1% of the total work force, make up
approximately 31 % of nursing aides and orderlies, 23% of bus drivers, 23% of correc
tional officers, and 9.5% of hotel clerks and retail salespersons. ANDREW HACKER,
Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 111 (1992).
97. African-Americans make up 4% of reporters and editors, 3.6% of engineers,
3% of physicians, 3.2% of lawyers, 1 % of architects, and 4.7% of waiters. Id. Professor
Derrick Bell has noted that work as a waiter or waitress is not an elite occupation and
does not require sophisticated training. BELL, supra note 22, at 6.
The suspicion arises that proprietors of restaurants and lounges may feel that
their white clienteles do not want their food and drinks handled by black em
ployees. Or it could stem from the belief that if a place has "too many" blacks
on its staff, it will drop to a lower status.
Id.
98. Robinson, supra note 29, at 76. From 1973 through 1986, the average real
earnings of African-American males under the age of 25 fell by 50%, and the percent
age of black males aged 18 to 29 in the labor force and securing full-time employment
fell from 44% to 35%. MANNING MARABLE, THE CRISIS OF COLOR AND DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS ON RACE, CLASS AND POWER 19 (1992).
99. E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospects for "Putting
America to Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. L.J. 2003, 2006 (1993).
100. Id. at 2007.
101. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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it may be helpful to focus on the extant use of Title VII in employ
ment discrimination litigation.

D.

Extant Use of Title VII

In 1966, charges of unlawful discrimination in hiring outnum
bered charges of discriminatory discharge by fifty percent. By 1985,
the relationship had been reversed, with termination charges out
numbering hiring charges by more than six to one.102 The ratio dur
ing the period 1989 to 1991 was approximately seven to one. 103
During fiscal years 1982 through 1989,61.9% of all EEOC charges
alleged discrimination in layoffs or terminations, and 10.3% alleged
discrimination in hiring. 104 In fiscal year 1993, a record number of
charges were filed with the EEOC. The agency received nearly
88,000 charges of employment discrimination, with race discrimina
tion alleged most frequently105 (49.6% of all charges).106
These figures reveal that Title VII, originally envisioned as a
tool for opening employment opportunities for African-Americans,
women, and other people of color, is now overwhelmingly used to
protect the existing positions of incumbent employees. 107 Since
that has become the principal use of the statute, employers face a
diminished risk of Title VII hiring suits, and may have no real in
centive to promulgate and implement employment practices that
address possible discrimination in hiring.
What factors explain the declining use of Title VII in hiring
matters? Some have argued that there is now less discrimination in
hiring. 1OB Others point to the real world disincentives of suing an
102. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employ
ment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991).
103. Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover
and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 403, 411 n.23 (1993).
104. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employ
ment Discrimination Litigation over Tthe Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709, 725
(1993).
105. Charges of Disability Discrimination Boost EEOC Intake By 22% in Fiscal
'93, BNA DAILY LAB. REP. at D4 (Jan. 13, 1994). Thirty-six percent of the charges
alleged discrimination on the basis of race; sex discrimination was alleged in 27% of the
charges, with sexual harassment claims making up 8.3% of all charges; age discrimina
tion was alleged in 22.6% of the charges; and disability discrimination was alleged in
17.4% of all charges. Id.
106. Id.
107. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 984.
108. See, e.g., Michael Fix, et aI., An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination, in
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA
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employer. An applicant who has not been hired is less likely to sue
an employer than an incumbent employee who has an established
relationship with the company.l09 Further, an applicant who is not
hired by a company may be less likely to suspect, and most likely
will not be in a position to shape, and prove, a claim of discrimina
tion. The applicant's contact with the employer may be limited to
the filing of an application or a short interview, the applicant will
not be familiar with the racial or sexual makeup of the employer's
work force, the applicant may not know the reasons for the decision
not to hire her or who made that decision, and the applicant will
have to continue her job search. If she finds other employment, she
may not wish to pursue an action against the company that rejected
her application. 110 An applicant contemplating a Title VII charge
and action must also consider the fact that such litigation can con
sume two or more years of her life, that she may not be able to
afford legal counsel,111 and that proving discrimination will be diffi
cult to uncover and prove as a matter of law. As to the last point, it
should be noted that African-Americans are not likely to win Title
VII cases,112 particularly when such cases are tried before judges
instead of juries. l13
Another concern relative to using Title VII to protect incum
bent employees is that the law may provide employers with a net
disincentive to hire minorities and women. 114
A worker who is not hired in the first place is obviously in no
position to bring a future firing suit. Thus, an employer must
9 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993) (arguing that blatant discrimination
has waned).
109. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1024-25.
110. Yelnosky, supra note 103, at 412.
111. As stated by Professor Yelnosky:
Because these [lower-skilled, entry-level] jobs typically pay lower wages, the
plaintiff may have difficulty paying a lawyer. Relying on a contingent fee
agreement also may be problematic because the lower wages used to generate
a back-pay award may not compensate a lawyer adequately. Finally, attor
neys' fees are available only to prevailing parties. The difficulty and expense
of proving a discrimination claim involving hiring for a lower-skilled, entry
level position will deter many attorneys from relying on the possibility of re
covering attorneys' fees to accept a case.
Id. at 412-13 (footnotes omitted). As pointed out by Professor Yelnosky, it is "too early
to tell whether the amendments to Title VII permitting awards of compensatory and
punitive damages will tend to make attorneys more available in cases offering no hope
of a substantial back-pay award." Id. at 412-13 n.35.
112. Culp, supra note 9, at 985.
113. Becker, supra note 6, at 1681.
114. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1024.
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consider the increase in expected costs when he hires a female or
minority worker, because some probability exists that the worker
will be fired and will sue. . . . The greater the likelihood that the
worker will ultimately be fired, and the higher the probability of
a firing suit, the greater are the expected costs imposed by hiring.
With the enormous increase in discharge cases, the probability
that a worker will bring a discriminatory firing suit is now sub
stantially higher than the probability that a worker will bring a
failure to hire SUit.115

On that view, the net effect of antidiscrimination litigation on the
hiring of minorities and women may be negative,116 for an "appli
cant who is not hired is not in a position to bring a subsequent firing
suit, and these cost savings must also be included in the employer's
calculation of the effect of failing to hire an applicant."117 If this
view is correct, the expected effects of Title VII would include a
reduction in the number of African-Americans employed118 and a
small increase (or even a decrease) in the average wages of African
American workers when the average includes those who are em
ployed and those who are not employed.H9
The notion that the probability of a discriminatory firing suit
will act as a disincentive with respect to the employment of African
Americans (and presumably others protected by Title VII) should
be examined more carefully. According to one study, only about
one percent of those individuals who believed that they had been
discriminated against even consulted a lawyer.12o Thus, instead of
"too many" Title VII actions, the reality is that there may have
been "too few" actions filed. l2l Moreover, while the volume of fed
eral employment discrimination litigation has increased many times
faster than the overall federal caseload122 (indeed, between fiscal
year 1970 and fiscal year 1989, the employment discrimination
caseload rose by 2166%),123 this growth does not mean, as a general
matter, that employers in general have experienced a significant
Id.
Id. at 1025; accord Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of
Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1987).
117. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1026.
118. Posner, supra note 116, at 519.
119. Id.
120. Becker, supra note 6, at 1679 (citing B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
PUBLIC 135-36 (1977}).
121. Id. at 1680.
122. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 983-84.
123. Id. at 985.
115.
116.
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surge in Title VII court litigation. 124 Ninety-five percent of employ
ers have never been sued in federal court, and in anyone year less
than one-half of one percent of firms covered by Title VII can ex
pect to be sued in a federal court. l25 In addition, the aggregate liti
gation costs for those firms sued under Title VII, when combined
with the budgets of the EEOC and the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs, amounts to perhaps one billion dollars, a di
minutive fragment of this nation's multi-trillion dollar economy.126
What about the current employee who is still working for her
employer and is contemplating a discrimination claim? That em
ployee must think twice. For instance, an employee who contends
that she has been harassed or unlawfully denied a promotion may
be legitimately concerned that the practical costs of bringing a claim
do not outweigh the benefits available under the statute. 127 The
employee may also fear employer retaliation,128 or be concerned
that her ongoing employment relationship will become strained as
she continues to work with the very individuals who the employee
has identified as alleged discriminators. Thus, "[i]n most cases, liti
gation is a viable option only when the employment relationship
124. In fiscal year 1993, the EEOC filed 401 court actions alleging unlawful dis
crimination, up from 354 suits filed in the preceding fiscal year. Tho hundred and sixty
three suits filed in fiscal year 1993 were filed under TItle VII, 114 under the Age Dis
crimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), four
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991),
two under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and 18 concurrently under two or
more statutes. Charges of Disability Discrimination Boost EEOC Intake by 22% in
Fiscal '93, 1994 DAILY LABOR REp. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 13, 1994).
125. John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1599 (1992).
In fiscal year 1993, the EEOC recovered $126.8 million through the EEOC admin
istrative process (an increase from the $117.7 million obtained in fiscal year 1992) and
another $34.2 million through litigation (down from the fiscal year 1992 total of $35
million). Charges of Disability Discrimination Boost EEOC Intake by 22% in Fiscal '93,
1994 DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 13, 1994).
126. Donohue, supra note 125, at 1600.
127. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1031. TItle VII claimants may
view the costs and benefits differently now that the statute provides for compensatory
and punitive damages in cases involving intentional discrimination. See supra note 84
and accompanying text.
128. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub
chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id.
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has been broken off (or never exis.ted)."129
III.

"DISCRIMINATION"

Title VII generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.13° In discussing the
meaning and concept of discrimination actionable under Title VII
as part of the assessment of the impact of the statute, we must ad
dress a "less familiar conceptual question-what do we mean by
discrimination?"131 More specifically, what do we mean by employ
ment discrimination?
The term "discrimination" is not defined in Title VII;132 hence,
the undefined statutory prohibition is "uninformative about the
role of discriminatory effects, the appropriate burdens of proof and
production, and the mechanisms for filtering out discriminatory
treatment."133 In the absence of such express direction and infor
mation set out in the statute, courts will fill in the statutory gaps and
open questions, through the norm-ridden exercise of developing
gap-filling rules, and will fashion and implement devices responsive
to the courts' view of how the statute should be read and under
stood. 134 Thus, the judiciary has the discretion to define "discrimi
nation" as it holds that certain acts are or are not discriminatory
within the meaning of Title VII. What norms and concepts of dis
crimination have the courts utilized 10 making that
determination?135
As a general matter, racial discrimination may be overt or in
stitutional. Overt discrimination occurs when "a harm is inflicted
or a benefit withheld either because of the perpetrator's racial bias
against the victim or because of that perpetrator's obliging the ra
cial prejudice of others. "136 Thus, an employer who refuses to hire
129. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 102, at 1032 (footnote omitted).
130. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for the full text of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1988).
131. Kelman, supra note 13, at 1159.
132. See BROOKS, supra note 55, at 55; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
133. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 118 (1990).
134. Id.
135. This discussion of concepts of discrimination is not intended to be exhaus
tive. In addition to the concepts addressed herein, the reader may wish to examine the
four categories of discrimination set forth by Professor Mark Kelman in a recent article.
See Kelman, supra note 13, at 1164-1204.
136. GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM & JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 9 (1991); see also Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989,
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African-Americans due to the employer's discriminatory bias, or
because the employer is concerned with the reactions of her biased
customers or employees, engages in overt discrimination. 137
Institutional discrimination occurs when an employer uses
practices that are ostensibly race-neutral but nevertheless have an
adverse impact on African-Americans as a group.138 Suppose, for
example, that an employer sets "neutral" qualification require
ments for a particular position. If some or many African-Ameri
cans lack those qualifications or skills because of the past and
present effects of de jure and de facto discrimination,139 purport
edly neutral job requirements will disqualify African-Americans at
a disproportionate rate relative to whites. In that circumstance, Af
rican-American unemployment and underemployment will result,
even where the employer is not engaging in overt discrimination.
A.

Title VII Discrimination Analyses

The two principal concepts and definitions of Title VII employ
ment discrimination formulated by the Supreme Court are dispa
rate treatment and disparate impact.1 4o Both concepts were
discussed in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States:
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less fa
vorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 123-26 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed.
1991) (discussing the victim and perpetrator perspectives of discrimination).
137. EZORSKY, supra note 136, at 9.
138. Id. I note my conclusion that facially neutral laws are not in fact neutral
because those laws are enacted, operated, and enforced against a cultural background
of racism. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in
Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1152 (1993). "Neutral rules cannot do
justice to the thickly embedded historical nature of American prejudice." Id. at 1153.
139. Given the past and present discrimination against African-Americans, it is
not surprising that many individuals who are black may not possess the educational
background or the employment skills and experience that an employer may seek when
selecting a work force. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP.
Cr. REV. 99, 114-15 ("[C]enturies of discrimination explicitly based on race have forced
some characteristics on blacks-on all blacks, simply because they are black, since that
was the basis of the discrimination.").
140. There are four general categories or theories of discrimination relevant to
the interpretation and application of Title VII: disparate treatment, disparate impact,
policies or practices which perpetuate in the present the effects of past discrimination,
and failure to make reasonable accommodations to an employee's religious observance
or practices. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 66, at 1 (footnote omitted). In this Arti
cle, I focus on disparate treatment and disparate impact.
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national ongm. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of differences in treatment. Undoubtedly disparate treatment
was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted
Title VII. ...
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from
claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employ
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of dif
ferent groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of
discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate im
pact theory. Either theory may, of course, be applied to a partic
ular set of facts.141

1.

Disparate Treatment

Disparate treatment analysis takes a restnctIve view of the
question of discrimination and downplays the significance of out
comes. 142 The analysis looks to individual justice, equality of op
portunity, equal treatment, and equal process (the process of
employer decision-making rather than the results reached through
that process).143 On that view, the primary objective of antidis
crimination law is to "prevent future wrongdoing rather than to re
141. 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (citations omitted). The Teamsters Court
also addressed the relevance of Title VII § 703(j) to the use of statistics as an eviden
tiary tool in employment discrimination cases. That section provides, in pertinent part:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer ...
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin employed by any employer ... in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(j) (1988). In Teamsters, the Court concluded that § 7030) was irrel
evant because statistical evidence was useful in discrimination cases and statistical dis
parities were often a "telltale sign" of intentional discrimination. 431 U.S. at 339-40
n.20.
142. See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transforma
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1342 (1988);
see also Joel W. Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action:
The Access Principle, 65 TEX. L. REv. 41,47 (1986) (disparate treatment is a fault-based
notion of discrimination, with liability occurring as the result of demonstrated racial
animus).
143. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts:
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of
Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971).

1994]

TITLE VII's REGULATORY REGIME

243

dress present manifestations of past injustice."144
Title VII disparate treatment theory requires proof of racial
animus and discriminatory motive; thus, a plaintiff must show that
an employer treats members of protected groups differently and
less favorably than it treats others because of their race. Evidence
of intentional discrimination may be difficult or impossible to se
cure, for few employers are brazen enough to express their discrim
inatory reasons and provide the plaintiff with "smoking gun"
evidence when making employment decisions. 145 Moreover, evi
dence of intentional discrimination is often difficult or impossible to
secure, as discriminatory motives may be disguised as neutral
acts.1 46
Given the substantial difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of
disparate treatment discrimination, plaintiffs typically resort to the
burden shifting framework set out by the Supreme Court in Mc
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 147 and Texas Department of Com
munity Affairs v. Burdine. 148 To prevail under that methodology, a
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment dis
crimination by a preponderance of the evidence. ' Such a showing is
"proof of actions taken by the employer from which discriminatory
animus [can be inferred] because experience has proved that in the
absence of any other explanation it is more likely than not those
actions were based on impermissible considerations."149 If a plain
tiff establishes a prima facie case, the court must then consider the
employer's justification for the presumptively discriminatory prac
tice or action. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate
a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its challenged actions.
However, the employer need not prove that it was actually moti
vated by the proffered reasons. 150 If the employer meets that bur
den, it has rebutted the inference of discrimination created by the
144. Crenshaw, supra note 142, at 1342.
145. See ARlHUR LARSON & LEX LARSON, 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 86.30, at 17-46 (1993).
146. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1986-87 (1990);
see generally Theodore Eisenberg & Sherri L. Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We
Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991).
147. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see George Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of
Proof" Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment Discrimina
tion, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 43 (1993) (arguing for reform of the McDonnell Douglas
framework).
148. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
149. Fumeo Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978).
150. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
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prima facie case. 151 The plaintiff must then demonstrate that the
employer's articulated reason for the employment practice or ac
tion is pretextual. 152
Given the relative ease in establishing the plaintiff's prima facie
case and the employer's articulation of a legitimate, non-discrimina
tory reason, the vast majority of disparate treatment cases turn on
the question whether the plaintiff can establish that the employer's
articulated reason for its action was in fact pretextual. 153 While it
was generally presumed that the pretext inquiry was the final step
of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, a recent Supreme
Court decision called for an additional step. In St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks,154 the Court held that the trier of fact's rejection of
the employer's asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its challenged actions did not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a
matter of law. Thus, a plaintiff who establishes that the employer's
proffered reason was in fact pretextual must also establish that the
employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of
race or other protected status. 155 The factfinder's disbelief of the
reasons put forward by the employer may suffice to show inten
tional discrimination, stated the Court, but the rejection of the de
fendant's reasons does not compel judgment for the plaintiff since
the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. 156 Under the
Court's "pretext-plus" approach,157 for example, a plaintiff could
establish that the employer's assertion that the plaintiff was dis
charged for absenteeism was in fact not true, but the plaintiff would
still fall short of proving disparate treatment. Hicks requires the
plaintiff to go beyond establishing pretext. The plaintiff must also
151. Id. at 253.
152. Id. at 256. Professo'r Richard Epstein has argued that the McDonnell Doug
las scheme reflects a dramatic shift in Title VII litigation and shifted the statute away
from a color-blind orientation to a protected-class limitation. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,
supra note 90, at 177. However, as noted by Professor George Rutherglen, Epstein
exaggerates the effect of McDonnell Douglas and fails to take into account the Supreme
Court's decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 n.6
(1976), wherein the Court held that white employees can also bring discrimination
claims under Title VII. See Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1474.
153. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 66, at 1155-56.
154. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
155. Id. at 2749.
156. Id.
157. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The
Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 57 (1991).
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introduce evidence that the basis for the challenged treatment was
race or other protected status.
Hicks increases the plaintiff's burden in disparate treatment
cases. As noted by Justice Souter in dissent, the Court's ruling
"saddles the victims of discrimination with the burden of either pro
ducing direct evidence of discriminatory intent or eliminating the
entire universe of possible nondiscriminatory reasons for a person
nel decision. "158
By telling the factfinder to keep digging in cases where the plain
tiff's proof of pretext turns on showing the employer's reasons to
be unworthy of credence, the majority rejects the very point of
the McDonnell Douglas rule requiring the scope of the factual
enquiry to be limited, albeit in a manner chosen by the employer.
What is more, the Court is throwing out the rule for the benefit
of employers who have been found to have given false evidence
in a court of law. There is simply no justification for favoring
these employers by exempting them from responsibility for
lies. 159
158. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The point made by
Justice Souter is best illustrated by an example found in Victoria A. Cundiff & Ann E.
Chaitovitz, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Lots ofSound and Fury, but What Does It
Signify?, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 147 (Winter 1993-94). An employer contends that an
employee was fired because the employee was habitually late. The plaintiff establishes
that this reason is pretextual by showing that employees not in the protected class had
far worse records of tardiness but were not disciplined, let alone discharged. The em
ployer actually discharged the plaintiff because its best customer asked the employer to
give the plaintiffs job to the customer's son. Id. at 148. Under the pretext-only ap
proach, the employer would lose because its proffered reason for the discharge-tardi
ness-was pre textual. Under the pretext-plus approach, the employer would lose only
where the plaintiff proved that the tardiness reason was pretextual and presented addi
tional evidence that the employer discharged the plaintiff because of the plaintiffs pro
tected status. [d.
The discussion of the foregoing example does not capture the full dimension of the
problems and issues raised by the pretext-plus approach. Assume that the employer's
reason for the discharge was proffered du~ng discovery, and was therefore set forth in
sworn depositions and sworn responses to interrogatories. In that circumstance, the
sworn testimony that tardiness was the reason for the discharge would be false testi
mony given under oath, and any rule of law that does not discourage or ferret out such
untruths is fundamentally flawed. Assume further that absent a truthful answer to the
question of why the plaintiff was discharged, it is not likely that the plaintiff will know
that she lost her job because the customer asked the employer to hire his son. Absent
knowledge of the real reason, how can the plaintiff prepare her case and engage in
discovery relative to the real reason?
Moreover, an employer who withholds ~he real and true reason for an employment
action can gain a tactical advantage. If the pretextuality of its stated reason is not
proven, the employer may continue to conceal the true reason. If pretextuality is estab
lished, why should the employer be allowed to use its ace in the hole, the real reason, to
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Title VII disparate treatment analysis, as developed by the
Supreme Court and applied by the lower courts, does not ade
quately address substantive inequalities existing at the time of dis
covery of racial bias and discrimination. As noted above,160
evidence of intentional discrimination is difficult (if not impossible)
to secure, as discriminatory acts are often concealed or disguised as
"neutral" acts.161 In addition, the adverse effects of past and pres
ent discrimination in housing, education, and other areas have
placed many African-Americans and other people of color at a dis
tinct disadvantage as they seek to enter and compete in the job
market.
Consider, for example, an African-American job applicant
who, because of past and present discrimination and subordination,
has grown up in a high-rise housing project, attended an un
derfunded and second class segregated school, and received an in
ferior education. That applicant enters an applicant pool
containing whites who have received first-rate educations at ade
quately funded schools. Before choosing from among the appli
cants, the employer requires each applicant to take an entry-level
exam covering basic math and English. 162 While it is possible that
the African-American applicant will score as high or higher than
the white applicants, it is more likely that the white applicant with a
good or excellent education will score higher than the African
American applicant with a poor education. That result is because
of exposure to the necessary education and skill acquisition and not
because of skin color. The employer who makes a final employ
ment decision on the basis of the test scores will argue that its reli
ance on the "neutral" test does not and could not constitute
unlawful discrimination by the employer against the African-Ameri
can applicant. The process for each applicant was the same, and
each applicant was treated in an "equal" fashion. Hence, the conse
quences of such acts and practices linger, and the reality of the dis
advantage continues to exist and has a real-world impact in the job
block the plaintiffs attempt to prove her case? And why should the litigants and the
court have any confidence that a party that has concealed the true reason for its actions
is now telling the truth when it presents the so-called real reason? Again, why should
the law countenance such behavior?
160. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
161. See Spann, supra note 52. See generally Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note
146 (the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination is revealed by the surprisingly
low number of claims filed).
162. I assume that the test is job-related and is not subject to a disparate impact
challenge.
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market, even when discriminatory acts and practices have been pro
hibited as a matter of law and even though, indeed because, the
present manifestations of past injustices are not addressed or
remedied. 163
2.

Disparate Impact

In contrast to disparate treatment analysis, disparate impact
theory is expansive, stresses equal achievement and equality as a
result, and views the question of discrimination from a group per
spective. 164 Under the disparate impact approach, "actual decisions
must meet some standard of proportionality-for example, the pro
portion of blacks or women in the applicant pool or the general
population."165 The disparate impact model thus
looks to the outcome of the race. It relates to the actual distribu
tion of jobs among racial classes and is concerned with both the
quantity and quality (measured, for example, by pay level and
social status) of the jobs. Jobs should be distributed so that the
relative economic position of Negroes ... is approximately equal
to that of whites. Disproportionate unemployment and under
employment of blacks should be eliminated or substantially
reduced. 166
The remediation and rectification of discrimination through
disparate impact analysis must extend to the group and to the
group's members.1 67 The analysis recognizes a "group right in the
sense that the locus of the claim to just results is in the group;
claims of individuals to participate in these results are derived by
virtue of group membership. "168
The Supreme Court recognized and applied the disparate im
pact model in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.169 In Griggs, the
163. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
164. See RONALD TURNER, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE AcrlON 7
(1990).
165. Julie O. Allen et aI., A Positive Theory of the Employment Discrimination
Cases, 16 J. CORP. L. 173, 175 (1991).
166. Fiss, supra note 143, at 237-38 (footnote omitted).
167. TURNER, supra note 164, at 7.
168. Paul N. Cox, The Supreme Court, Title VII and "Voluntary" Affirmative Ac
tion-A Critique, 21 IND. L. REV. 767, 785-86 (1988); see also Friedman, supra note 142,
at 48-49 (stating that equal achievement "is by nature a relative concept because it
assesses equality by gauging the respective shares of employment opportunities enjoyed
by various race, gender, or other groups").
169. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For commentary on Griggs, see FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,
supra note 90, at 192-204; Alfred W. Blumrosen, Griggs Was Correctly Decided-A
Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 443 (1986); Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An
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Court held that Title VII prohibited employment practices that dis
qualified a disproportionate number of African-Americans unless
the practices were justified by business necessity po The Court
wrote that, under Title VII, "practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be main
tained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimina
tory employment practices."171 As stated by the Court:
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment
or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in
the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On
the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and
condition of the job-seeker be taken into account. It has-to re
sort again to the fable-provided that the vessel in which the
milk is proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited. 172

In addition, the Griggs Court stated that "good intent or ab
sence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment proce
. dures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."173
Congress "directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of em
ployment practices, not simply the motivation,"174 and "placed on
the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question."175
Thus, the Griggs Court determined that so-called objective cri
teria may be unlawful under Title VII when those criteria have an
adverse impact affecting members of a protected group (e.g., wo
men and African-Americans) at a significantly and disproportion
ately higher rate than they affect individuals outside the protected
Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employ
ment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985);
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrim
ination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987).
170. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
171. Id. at 430.
172. Id. at 431.
173. Id. at 432.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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group.176 Proof of such disparate impact is invariably quantitative
and focuses on the actual operation of a system or the operation of
a system if applied to a population of potential applicants. 177 Statis
tical evidence of the disparate impact is viewed as not merely cir
cumstantial but as "direct evidence of the results which [would]
trigger the demand for additional justification" by the employer.178
One purpose of the disparate impact theory, as formulated by
the Griggs Court, was to facilitate the identification of discrimina
tory situations where, through either inertia or insensitivity, em
ployers were following policies that gratuitously and needlessly
(although not necessarily deliberately) excluded African-Ameri
cans (or other members of a protected class) from equal employ
ment opportunitiesP9 On that view, good faith or the absence of
discriminatory intent or animus does not render lawful the dispa
rate impact of an employment practice unrelated to business neces
sity or job performance. 180 Consider, again, the example noted
above regarding the African-American job applicant,181 and assume
176. One test used to determine disparate or adverse impact is set forth in the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures ("Uniform Guidelines"), 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4(0) (1993). Under the Uniform Guidelines, a test or other selection
device will normally be deemed to have an adverse or disparate impact if it has a "selec
tion rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty
percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate." Id.
An example of the 4/5 rule is found in Marion G. Sobol & Charles J. Ellard, Meas
ures of Employment Discrimination: A Statistical Alternative to the Four-Fifths Rule, 10
INDUS. REL. L.J. 381 (1988). Suppose that of 500 white applicants se~king a position,
400 are selected for employment (an 80% ratio). Suppose, further, that of 500 African
American applicants, 200 are selected (a 40% ratio). If the African-American selection
ratio (4O%) is divided by the white selection ratio (80%), there is an impact ratio of
50%. Because the 50% impact ratio is less than the 4/5 or 80% percent benchmark of
the Uniform Guidelines, an adverse or disparate impact on African-American appli
cants would be established. Id. at 389.
For criticism of the 80% rule, see Elaine W. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in
Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978).
For an alternative to the rule, see Sobol & Ellard, supra.
177. See DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DIS
CRIMINATION 47 (1980).
178. [d. at 47-48. The statistical models and methodology employed in Title VII
disparate impact cases are beyond the scope of this Article. For discussions of those
subjects, see Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989); BALDUS & COLE, supra
note 177, at 44-51, 53-75; WALTER B. CONNOLLY ET AL., USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION §§ 2 & 3 (1992).
Also beyond the scope of this Article is any explication of the use of standard
deviations in employment discrimination cases. See generally WAYNE C. CURTIS, STA
TISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR ATTORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1983).
179. Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992).
180. See TURNER, supra note 164, at 144-45.
181. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
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that the employer's test and related employment decisions dispro
portionately exclude African-Americans. Under disparate treat
ment theory, the employer could argue that all applicants had been
treated alike and that it had not discriminated against (i.e., had no
racial animus toward) the African-American applicants. Under
Griggs and its progeny,182 the fact that the employer treated each
applicant equally in terms of taking the test, and had no racial ani
mus toward the applicant, would not be dispositive. Instead, the
employer could be required to justify the use of the test and to
prove that the test was job-related or was related to business
necessity.
For many, the notion that an employer could violate Title VII
without intending to do so was, and is, controversial. 183 The princi
pal prohibitions of Title VII did not refer to the disparate impact
theory, and the only provision of the statute that even arguably al
luded to the theory protected professionally developed tests that
182. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (holding that unlawful dis·
crimination may exist when the employer's statistics appear to favor minorities); New
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (holding that dismissal
of employees who are in a methadone drug treatment program may be job·related);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that height and weight require
ments for prison guards has a disparate impact on women, and is not job-related since
no correlation was shown between height/weight and ability to perform the job); Al
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (holding that discriminatory tests are
impermissible unless they are shown to be job related-i.e., that they are predictive of
job performance).
183. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 169 (arguing that violation of Title VII should be
found only when the discrimination was intentional). Professor Steven Greenberger
has written that the answer to the question whether Griggs was wrongly decided de
pends upon the manner in which a court should read a statute.
The text of Title VII is ambiguous as to whether the use of a non-job-related
selection device which disproportionately excludes minorities is illegal. If, as
Justice Scalia believes, the text is all that a court should consider in interpret
ing a statute, then it is hard to know how the case should have been decided.
Alternatively, if, as is traditional, the legislative history of the statutory lan
guage is considered as well, then the available evidence suggests that Title VII
should not have been read at the time to incorporate impact doctrine. That
conclusion, too, however, is not wholly certain because the doctrine was never
directly debated by Congress. Finally, if the statute is read so as to further the
congressional purpose in enacting it, then there is a strong argument that
Griggs was correctly decided. Congress was concerned with more than the
immorality of explicit racial exclusion, abominable and pervasive though it
was. Congress was concerned as well with what it termed the "economic
waste" of high African-American unemployment, because it devastated the
lives of African-Americans and dampened the economic productivity of the
nation.
Greenberger, supra note 56, at 266-67 (footnotes omitted).
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were not used as a pretext for discrimination. l84 Nevertheless, the
Griggs disparate impact analysis was effective until approximately
1977, at which time its usefuln~ss was limited by Supreme Court
decisions "that imposed procedural barriers in the way of class ac
tions, eliminated seniority systems from the scope of the theory,
and made the plaintiff's initial showing of adverse impact much
more complicated."185 One of those decisions, Hazelwood School
District v. United States,186 set out the required inquiry into the
proper definition of the labor market and the methods of demon
strating underrepresentation of specific groups in an employer's
work force. 187 That decision "transformed proof of disparate im
pact from [a] simple matter ... to a highly technical issue on which
expert testimony usually must be taken. Only if a plaintiff sur
mounts this initial hurdle under the theory of disparate impact is
any burden of proof placed upon the defendant. "188
Despite the fact that Griggs was the law of the land for eight
een years, it was not accepted by the Reagan Administration. 189 In
a 1988 decision, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,190 the Supreme
Court held that the disparate impact analysis could be applied to
subjective employment criteria. 191 A plurality of the Court also
concluded, inter alia, that a disparate impact plaintiff had to identify
184. Rutherglen, supra note 169, at 1298. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides, in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un
lawful employment practice for an employer ... to give and act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
185. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1476 (footnote omitted). See Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (holding that the relevant statistical compari
son is between the racial composition of the teaching staff and that of the teacher popu
lation and not between the African-American teachers and students in the school); East
Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (holding that in order to
qualify as a class action, the class must make a pretrial motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
P. 23 to be certified as a class); Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977) (hOlding that § 703(h) protects bona fide seniority systems from Title VII chal
lenges even if they perpetuate pre-Title VII discrimination).
186. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
187. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1476.
188. Id.
189. Former Reagan Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried "concen
trated on what [he] cared about: taming Griggs, with its pressure toward quotas ...."
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRST.
HAND ACCOUNT 119 (1991).
190. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
191. Id. at 999.
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the specific employment practices causing the disparate impact,192
and that the employer bore a burden of producing a legitimate busi
ness justification for its practices but did not bear the burden of
persuasion. 193 According to former Solicitor General Charles
Fried, the Watson decision "gave us our signal to press for a more
thorough re-examination of what the lower courts had been doing
in Griggs-type cases."194
Fried's efforts were successful, as Griggs was effectively dis
mantled by the Court's 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Atonio. 195 In that decision, the Court established higher evi
dentiary standards for Title VII disparate impact plaintiffs trying to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on statistics, and
concluded that the use of bottom-line statistics were not sufficient
to establish a prima facie case. 196 The Wards Cove Court also held
that section 7030) was relevant to the use and role of statistics in
Title VII cases,197 and concluded, for the first time, that causation
was an element of the disparate impact analysis. 198 The business
necessity defense was changed to a legitimate business-justification
defense (which included a cost justification defense), and the Court
imposed the burden of production (but not persuasion) on
employers. 199
Congress addressed and reversed significant aspects of Wards
Cove in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA").2°O The CRA codi
192. Id. at 994.
193. Id. at 997.
194. FRIED, supra note 189, at 227 n.64.
195. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
196. Id. at 650-5l.
197. This view of § 703(j) is different from the view expressed by the Court in its
Teamsters decision. See supra note 14l.
198. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 656.
199. Id. at 659; see Belton, supra note 67, at 926. For commentary on Wards Cove,
see SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 205-07; Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting
Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins
and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359 (1990); L. Camille Hebert, Redefining the Bur
dens of Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards
Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1990); Mack A. Player, Is
Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) On Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Ronald Thrner, The Rehnquist Court and Title VII Disparate Im
pact Theory: Atonio's Burden Allocation and the Retreat from Griggs, 16 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 139 (1989); Leland Ware, Resurrecting Racial Barriers, 38 Loy. L. REV. 39 (1992).
200. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified
as amended in various sections of 2 U.S. C., 29 U.S.c., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
2000e). The Civil Right Act ("CRA") overturned a number of employment discrimina
tion decisions issued by the Supreme Court in the 1989 and 1990 terms, "expand[ed] the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims
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fied the disparate impact theory and a causation requirement;201 re
jected the Wards Cove legitimate business justification defense and
replaced that defense with one requiring the employer to "demon
strate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity;"202 and placed the
burdens of persuasion and production on employers. 203 At least
two issues, however, were left unresolved. First, Congress did not
decide whether section 7030) was relevant204 or irrelevant205 to the
use of statistical evidence in Title VII cases. Second, the congres
sional codification of the job-relatedlbusiness necessity standard did
not define those terms,206 and thus left in place the questions,
of discrimination," CRA § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071, and found that "additional remedies
under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimina
tion in the workplace." CRA § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071. See generally Kingsley R. Browne,
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," A Codification of Griggs, a Partial Return
to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 287 (1993) (examining
effect of Civil Rights Act of 1991 on disparate impact theory of discrimination as it
relates to affirmative action); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief
Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial 1nterpretation, 68 No
TRE DAME L. REV. 923 (1993) (criticizing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as ambiguous,
resulting in giving courts tremendous interpretive power).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 1992).
202. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
203. The "term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of production and per
suasion." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(m) (Supp. IV 1992).
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
206. Resort to legislative history to define or give meaning to the terms is prohib
ited by the CRA itself. Section 105(b) of the CRA provides:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137
Congressional Record S. 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered
legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in constru
ing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove-Busi
ness necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.
CRA § 105(b), 105 Stat. at 1075. Even if resort to the legislative history was permissi
ble, the history on this particular point is not helpful, for the interpretive memorandum
referred to in § 105(b) provides:
The final compromise on S. 1745 agreed to by several Senate sponsors, includ
ing Senators DANFORTH, KENNEDY, and DOLE, and the Administration states
that with respect to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative
business practice-the exclusive legislative history is as follows:
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended to reflect
the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
When a decision-making process includes particular, functionally-inte
grated practices which are components of the same criterion, standard,
method of administration, or test, such as the height and weight requirements
designed to measure strength in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977),
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equivocations, and ambiguities which characterized disparate im
pact law prior to Wards Cove. 207
In sum, disparate impact analysis allows plaintiffs to establish
violations of Title VII even though they have no evidence that an
employer deliberately excluded African-Americans or women or
other people belonging to a protected class from equal employment
opportunities. In theory, that approach permits plaintiffs to evade
the practical problem and very real difficulty of coming up with
"smoking gun" evidence of overt discrimination and racial animus.
The initial and prima facie view is that the absence or "under
representation" of African-Americans or other protected groups in
an employer's work force is not mere happenstance. Nevertheless,
an employer may demonstrate that unlawful discrimination is not
the cause of the composition of its work force, and plaintiffs cer
tainly may encounter difficulties in establishing a disparate impact
cause of action. 208
B.

Economic Models of Discrimination

What is the relationship between the "market" and discrimina
tion?209 What are the implications of that relationship for employthe particular, functionally-integrated practices may be analyzed as one em
ployment practice.
137 CONGo REc. S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
207. Belton, supra note 67, at 931; Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1477.
208. For example, a disparate impact plaintiff must now demonstrate that each
particular challenged practice causes a disparate impact unless the plaintiff can demon
strate to the court that the elements of an employer's decision making process are not
capable of separation for analysis; if the plaintiff makes the latter demonstration, the
decision making process may be analyzed as one employment practice. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
Plaintiffs must satisfy the causation element only if the employer uses a multi
criteria selection practice and the criteria cannot be disaggregated. If the deci
sionmaking process can be disaggregated, then bottom-line statistics, which
the Court apparently disapproved of in Wards Cove, are insufficient to estab
lish a prima facie case.
Belton, supra note 67, at 928 (footnotes omitted). The standard for determining when
multi-criteria selection practices (for example, education, tenure, job title, job perform
ance, and the subjective evaluations of supervisors) can or cannot be disaggregated are
not set out in the statute and will be defined by courts presented with that issue. Id.
"Moreover, employers seeking to minimize liability in disparate impact cases may be
encouraged to adopt multi-selection decisionmaking procedures that lend themselves to
disaggregation." Id. at 929.
209. For general information on this relationship, see MATS LUNDAHL & ESKIL
WADENSJO, Unequal Treatment: A Study in the Neo-Classical Theory of Discrimina
tion (1984); DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees
eds., 1973); ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (Emily P. Hoffman ed.,
1991).
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ment discrimination law? Do markets end or at least reduce
discrimination, or do markets foster discrimination?210 Is there
anything in an economic analysis of antidiscrimination law that can
better inform our view of, and judgments with respect to, Title VII?
Is discrimination sometimes rational?211 Two general types of labor
market discrimination advanced by neoclassical economists-taste
discrimination and statistical discrimination-2I2 are discussed in
this section.
The Taste for Discrimination
Professor Gary Becker213 has posited that if an individual has a
1.

"taste for discrimination," he must act as ifhe were willing to pay
something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to
be associated with some persons instead of others. When actual
discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either payor forfeit in
come for this privilege. This simple way of looking at the matter
gets at the essence of prejudice and discrimination. 214
210. Milton Friedman and others have argued that employment discrimination
laws are unnecessary because free markets would address the problem of discrimina
tion. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). In Friedman's view,
antidiscrimination
legislation involves the acceptance of a principle that proponents would find
abhorrent in almost every other application. If it is appropriate for the state to
say that individuals may not discriminate in employment because of color or
race or religion, then it is equally appropriate for the state, provided a major
ity can be found to vote that way, to say that individuals must discriminate in
employment on the basis of color, race or religion. The Hitler Nuremberg
laws and the laws in the Southern states imposing special disabilities upon
Negroes are both examples of laws similar in principle to [antidiscrimination
law].
Id. at 113.
211. Consider the following view:
We don't so much operate irrationally in an otherwise sound world as create a
world with irrationality built into its very structure. Once we create a world
where race matters, we become unaware of our creation's contingency. Racial
generalizations come to seem natural, a sort of baseline, "the way things are."
What· now seems irrational is to hire a black or let one in your law school.
These decisions require "affirmative action" and are thus morally troublesome
. . . . Individual actions work in concert ineluctably to reinforce the racial
status quo. It feels like freedom, like individual choice. Yet the effect is
tyranny.
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
212. Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
228 (1986).
213. For a discussion of pre-Becker economic theories of discrimination, see
LUNDAHL & WADENSJO, supra note 209, at 8-20.
214. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971).
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Emphasizing the words "as if," Becker notes that an individual
must act as if she were "willing to forfeit income in order to avoid
certain transactions. "215 In his view, an employer who refuses to
hire blacks solely because the employer erroneously underesti
mated their economic efficiency engages in discriminatory behavior
"not because he is prejudiced against them but because he is igno
rant of their true efficiency. Ignorance may be quickly eliminated
by the spread of knowledge, while a prejudice (i.e., preference) is
relatively independent of knowledge."216
Generally, the taste for discrimination will have a greater nega
tive impact on the incomes of African-Americans, as the reduction
in African-Americans' incomes will be proportionately greater than
the reduction in the income of whites. 217 This is so because "blacks
are only a small part of the economy, [and] the number of advanta
geous exchanges that blacks can make with whites is greater than
the number of advantageous transactions that whites can make with
blacks."218
Assum[ing] that whites do not like to associate with [African
Americans], but that [African-Americans] are indifferent to the
racial identity of those with whom they associate[, t]he incomes
of many whites will be lower than they would be if they did not
have such a taste[, for those whites] forego advantageous ex
changes [such as refusing] to sell their houses to blacks who are
willing to pay higher prices than white purchasers.219

Likewise, a racial preference and taste for discrimination held
by whites will result in the reduction of incomes of blacks by
preventing them from making advantageous transactions with
whites. 22o Applying that analysis in the employment context, an
employer's decision to forego an advantageous transaction (for ex
ample, refusing to hire an African-American applicant because of
that individual's race) can have economic effects on both the em
ployer and the applicant. The employer discriminates by not hiring
the worker, thereby foregoing the utilization of that worker's skill
in production or service,221 or will only hire that worker at a lower
215. Id. at 16.
216. Id. (footnote omitted).
217. Id. at 22-24; Posner, supra note 116, at 515-16.
218. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 352 (2d ed. 1983).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. The cost incurred by the employer in not hiring the applicant is the em
ployer's own disutility. See Strauss, supra riote 14, at 1621-22.
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wage. 222
Given the assumption that discrimination will result in a differ
ence in the wages paid to whites and African-Americans (specifi
cally, that whites will receive a higher wage than blacks (Ww >
Wb»,223 the taste model would eliminate the effectiveness of the
discrimination since, it is argued, labor and capital would move to
those firms and industries that did not discriminate at all or discrim
inated in some lesser fashion. 224 Under this model, the market
would address discrimination in the long run since labor and capital
would shift to firms and industries that did not discriminate or that
discriminated less.225 "[I]n the long run, people with equal ability
will be paid equal wages, and there will be no effective, i.e, market
observed, discrimination in wages between black and white work
ers."226 Those firms "not in equilibrium will either pay a premium
through reduced profits or find niches in the market where black
workers are not necessary and where discrimination, though real,
will not influence market wages. "227 The discriminators "will ulti
mately be driven from the market because they indulge their
prejudices at the expense of profits."228
Suppose that an employer does not have a taste for discrimina
tion, but third parties-employees or customers-do, and the third
parties refuse to work with or be served by African-American
222. In that circumstance, the effective cost incurred by the employer is "the sum
of the money wage and the additional cost to the employer resulting from the taste for
discrimination." Id. "Consequently, in order to account for the additional costs, a mi
nority employee's money wage will be less than her marginal product." Id.
223. Culp, supra note 9, at 983-84.
224. Id. at 984.
Suppose, for example, that the source of discrimination is bigoted owners.
The refusal of bigoted owners to hire black workers will lead to black unem
ployment, and blacks will be willing to work at depressed wages. This large
pool of workers, who will work for wages that are below their actual produc
tive value, provides an opening for nondiscriminating firms to earn large eco
nomic profits. They can hire black workers, pay them some amount less than
white workers, lower prices, and eventually drive the bigoted firms out of
business.
E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospects for "Putting America to
Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. L.J. 2003, 2028 (1993).
225. Culp, supra note 9, at 984.
226. Id. (footnote omitted).
227. Id.
228. Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 753
(1991) (footnote omitted). The conclusion that the market will eliminate racism is con
tradicted by the view that the "United States has had a free market economy for over
two centuries, and racism is as firmly entrenched as ever." Delgado, supra note 211, at
1190.
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workers. 229 In that circumstance, an employer will incur additional
costs in higher wages paid to non-minority workers with a taste for
discrimination, or in reduced productivity by those workers. 23o If a
customer or customers have the taste for discrimination, such as a
law firm's clients who prefer not to be represented by African
American lawyers or restaurant patrons who prefer not to be
served by a black waiter, the employer will incur additional costs
because its customers are not willing, or are less willing, to do busi
ness with firms or businesses employing African-Americans. 231
While employer recognition and acceptance of third party dis
crimination may in some instances maximize profits, it will also re
sult in discrimination against African-Americans, even though the
employer has no racial animus and is not bigoted against African
Americans. In that instance, the motivation for the employer's con
duct is its economic self-interest.232 Thus, according to the taste
model, the economic impact of third parties who are in a position to
financially "punish" a nondiscriminatory employer results from the
ability of third parties to
[p]ressure employers in the direction of discrimination, even if
employers would, other things being equal, choose not to dis
criminate or have no particular view about whether to discrimi
nate or not. Ironically, it is the failure to discriminate that
operates as a tax on the employer's business, rather than vice
versa. And when this is so, reliance on competitive pressures will
force employers to behave in a discriminatory manner if they
wish to survive. 233
On that view, market pressures create, and do not prevent,
discrimination. 234
2.

Statistical Discrimination

Consider an employer who wishes to pay his white employees
more than his African-American employees (Ww > Wb), but is re
quired by antidiscrimination laws to pay equal wages to both whites
and African-Americans (Ww = Wb).235 That employer may re
229.
230.

See BECKER, supra note 214, at chs. 3, 4.
Strauss, supra note 14, at 1622.

231.

Id.

232. BECKER, supra note 214, at 14-15; SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 753.
233. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, in REASSESSING
CIVIL RIGHTS 22, 25 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1991).

234.

Id.

235.

Culp, supra note 9, at 984.
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spond to the equal wage requirement by limiting the number of Af
rican-Americans hired, or by hiring African-Americans who are not
as highly skilled as (some) white workers 236 and paying those Afri
can-Americans the same wage as whites, resulting in a loss on each
African-American hired. 237
In making the decision to limit the number of African-Ameri
can hires or to possibly hire blacks with "lesser" skills, an employer
may rely on proxies, stereotypes, and generalizations in predicting
performance
not because he hates or devalues blacks or women, or because he
has a general desire to avoid them, or is prejudiced ... but be
cause he believes (on the basis either of plausible assumption or
actual experience) that the relevant stereotypes have sufficient
truth to provide a rational basis for employment decisions. 238

When a "rational" employer who does not have a taste for discrimi
nation nevertheless discriminates by determining that race, sex, etc.,
is a proxy for employment qualifications,239 that employer engages
in statistical discrimination. 24O
By responding to generalizations and stereotypes and employ
ing them as an "economically rational basis for employment deci
sions,"241 the employer chooses to avoid the costs of inquiring into
and establishing an individual's qualifications. Instead, the em
ployer relies upon the proxy of race and correlates that proxy with
qualifications. When better information about an individual's qual
ifications is more costly to discover, "it will be rational, profit-maxi
mizing behavior for the firm to offer lower wages to a minority
236. Because of past and present discrimination against African-Americans and
others, African-Americans as a group fall behind whites as a group in certain social
indicators (for example, poverty, education, and employment), and it is therefore plau
sible that in some contexts race and other status is "every bit as accurate a signalling
device as, say, test score[s], education, and previous employment." Sunstein, supra note
233, at 27. Consequently, utilization of the statistical discrimination model would harm
African-Americans and other groups more than whites.
237. Culp, supra note 9, at 984. An antidiscrimination law that forbids Ww > Wb
can result in either additional information costs to the employer or a departure from the
optimum wage (which is the "wage equal to a worker's marginal product"). Posner,
supra note 116, at 516. Such a law reduces efficiency, which should not be confused
with social equity. Id.
238. SUNSTEIN, supra note 133, at 756.
239. Schwab, supra note 212.
240. Statistical discrimination is the "most significant form of racial discrimina
tion that exists in contemporary American culture." SPANN, supra note 52, at 121.
241. Sunstein, supra note 233, at 26.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

260

[Vol. 16:219

employee than it would offer to a nonminority employee."242 An
employer engaging in such discrimination does not do so because of
a taste for discrimination or because the employer is prejudiced
against African-Americans; rather, the employer will act on the be
lief that the stereotypes, generalizations, and proxies related to a
person's race, sex, or color are sufficiently true to serve as a rational
basis for employment decisions. 243 "This would be unfair to blacks
who were in fact above average, yet might still be an efficient
method (in the presence of high information costs) of compensating
black workers."244

C.

Evaluation

Taste-based discrimination (the result of an exogenous prefer
ence)245 and statistical discrimination (the result of imperfect infor
mation)246 both violate Title VII since an employer engaging in
either form of discrimination treats African-Americans differently
from the way it treats non-black workers or applicants. 247 An em
ployer who refuses to hire African-Americans because of the em
ployer's prejudice or' bigotry, or because third parties who do
business with the employer are prejudiced or bigoted, engages in
disparate treatment, i.e., treats African-Americans differently and
adversely because of their race. 248 An employer who refuses to hire
African-Americans because of stereotypes or some generalized
view of African-Americans, or who employs selection devices or
criteria that disproportionately exclude African-Americans, may be
said to have engaged in disparate treatment and/or disparate impact
discrimination. 249
Furthermore, both models of discrimination have adverse ef
fects on the acquisition and use of human capital. The existence of
discrimination affects individual decisions concerning education,
employment, and the like, for rational African-Americans should
be expected to invest relatively less in such areas given the reality
that, because of discrimination, they will not be able to fully use the
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
. 248.
249.

Strauss, supra note 14, at 1622.
Sunstein, supra note 233, at 27.
Posner, supra note 116, at 516.
Strauss, supra note 14, at 1623.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142-208 and accompanying text.
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acquired skills in the workplace. 250 Consider, for example, the situ
ation faced by African-Americans who wished to practice as attor
neys in the not too distant past. Paul Robeson, an All-American
athlete and Phi Beta Kappa scholar, enjoyed an international career
as a stage, screen, recording, and concert star. Prior to embarking
on that career, Robeson graduated from Columbia University Law
School and worked for a New York law firm specializing in estates.
During his brief tenure with that firm, Robeson buzzed for a ste
nographer to take down a memorandum of law he had prepared.
The stenographer refused to work with Robeson, stating, "I never
take dictation from a nigger. "251 When Robeson discussed the inci
dent with the attorney who had hired him, he was advised that his
prospects in the law were limited since the firm's wealthy white cli
ents were not likely to agree to let him try a case for fear that his
race would be a detriment. The white attorney also offered to con
sider opening a Harlem branch of the firm and putting Robeson in
charge of the branch. Robeson resigned and never practiced as a
lawyer again. 252 Given such encounters, it is conceivable that a "ra
tional" African-American might choose not to pursue a legal edu
cation or, if she had obtained a law degree and met the
requirements for admission to the practice, might expect less than
optimal returns on that investment.
Similarly, the taste for discrimination andstatistical discrimina
tion may shape and adversely affect the preferences of both dis
criminators and those who are subjected to the discrimination. 253
Discriminators may conclude that the victims of discrimination "de
serve their fate, that they are responsible for it, or that the current
situation is part of an intractable, given, or natural order."254 Those
who are subjected to discrimination may be inclined to reduce the
cognitive dissonance they experience by "adapting their prefer
ences to the available opportunities."255 Thus, discriminators may
prefer things as they are now, and may deny or not even be able to
see that discrimination exists, or that it is a serious problem. Those
who are discriminated against may not form certain preferences
250. Sunstein, supra note 233, at 29.
251. MARTIN B. DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON 55 (1989).
252. Id.
253. Sunstein, supra note 238, at 759.
254. Id.
255. Id. Professor Sunstein has pointed out that the "reduction of cognitive disso
nance is a powerful motivating force: people attempt to bring their beliefs and percep
tions in line with existing practice." Id.
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may not prefer to be lawyers or doctors, or pursue an education, or
other goals-because it is unlikely that they will be able to follow
through on their preferences and achieve their goals. Statistical dis
crimination perpetuates the effects of past discrimination and racial
stratification,256 as there will be no legally required efforts made to
address and redress the reality and consequences of such
discrimination.
In sum, the term "discrimination" encompasses actions and de
cisions that
treat[] an otherwise similarly qualified black, woman, or handi
capped person less favorably than a white, male, or able-bodied
person, whether the reason for the decision lies in malice, taste,
selective empathy and indifference, economic self-interest, or ra
tional stereotyping. This understanding of discrimination picks
up not merely covert unequal treatment, but also requirements
that are neutral "on their face" but that would not have been
adopted if the burdened and benefitted groups had been
reversed.
It follows that the claim of discrimination, best understood,
is not for prevention of certain irrational acts, or of "prejudice,"
but instead for the elimination, in places large and small, of
something in the nature of a caste system.257

Does Title VII effectively address the aforementioned concep
tions of discrimination? Should the current approach to Title VII
be scrapped in favor of other approaches? Recent proposals by
Professors David Strauss and Derrick Bell are two vehicles for con
sidering these questions.
IV.

THE STRAUSS AND BELL PROPOSALS

As discussed above,258 certain aspects of the current Title VII
regulatory regime do not advance the objective of promoting the
access of African-Americans to the workplace in the most effica
cious and user-friendly manner. These problems include the reali
ties of EEOC procedures, lengthy and expensive federal court
litigation, the paradigms of discrimination recognized by the courts
applying Title VII, and the hoped for but unrealistic expectations
256. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action:
Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1065 (1992) (arguing that
the use of mandatory quotas or numerical goals in the college and graduate school
admissions process is necessary to remedy discrimination).
257. Sunstein, supra note 233, at 34 (footnotes omitted).
258. See supra notes 102-29 and accompanying text.
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regarding the extent to which Title VII can effectively address en
trenched and arguably permanent racism.
As the federal courts' dockets grow and the courts are increas
ingly unable to attend to Title VII and other discrimination cases in
a timely manner, employment discrimination cases may linger for
years. 259 The costs of litigation can be high, and the expense of
bringing and prosecuting a Title VII suit can discourage a victim
from pursuing a claim.260 Plaintiffs' attorneys, relying on contin
gent fee agreements and attorneys' fees statutes, may not be able or
willing to finance the litigation. Plaintiffs must also take into ac
count the reduction in the real value of any monetary award result
ing from the delay in receiving the award. 261 Are there better ways
of addressing the question of workplace discrimination under the
law?
A.

The Strauss Proposal

In a 1991 article,262 Professor David Strauss identified "what
the purposes of the current generation of employment discrimina
tion laws should be" and suggested "institutional arrangements that
promote these purposes."263 According to Strauss, the "objectives
of the antidiscrimination laws are not best served by trying to detect
individual acts of discrimination. Instead, the employment discrimi
nation laws should be designed to give employers incentives to hire
and promote members of minority groups in proportion to their
representation in the relevant population."264
Professor Strauss noted two objections to the disparate treat
ment approach to employment discrimination. 265 "First, it is very
difficult to ferret out acts of covert discrimination, and covert dis
crimination is the form that employment discrimination is most
likely to take today."266 Consequently, the "likelihood of error
See James A. King, Jr. et aI., Agreeing to Disagree on EEOC Disputes, 9
97, 99 (1993) (examining problems caused by increased antidiscrimination
litigation and the overburdened federal court system and proposing alternative dispute
resolution as a solution).
260. Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Reso
lution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,6-7 (1990); King et aI., supra note
259, at 99.
261. King et aI., supra note 259, at 99; Summers, supra note 75, at 488, 536-37.
262. Strauss, supra note 14.
263. Id. at 1620.
264. Id.
265. On disparate treatment, see supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text.
266. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1644.
259.

LAB. LAW.
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under this standard is high, and the costs of administering it are
likely to be great."267 In Strauss' view, "[t]he second problem is
that the disparate treatment approach will be least successful at
combatting the kinds of discrimination that are most likely to per
sist in a competitive system."268 For Strauss, the disparate treat
ment standard "is most effective at duplicating the work that the
market is likely to do anyway, and least effective at doing the an
tidiscrimination work that the market cannot do."269 The disparate
impact standard270 is superior to the disparate treatment approach,
argues Strauss, and "[n]umerical standards are a more efficient way
of fulfilling the moral premises that underlie the consensus against
discrimination."271
Professor Strauss sketched an institutional arrangement that
would implement his theoretical conclusions with respect to Title
VII and employment discrimination.
First, private individuals should not be able to bring suits for dis
criminatory treatment under the employment discrimination
laws. Discriminatory treatment claims should be screened in the
way that unfair labor practice claims are currently screened by
the National Labor Relations Board: a government agency de
cides, on the basis of an informal investigation, whether the claim
has merit. The agency has discretion to pursue the claim on be
half of the individual if it wishes. If the agency does not pursue
the claim the individual cannot. As a practical matter, even
under this system, claims of disparate treatment could still be
brought as state wrongful discharge actions, and in employment
grievance proceedings.272

According to Strauss, "the purpose of this reform would be to re
duce the resources expended on disparate treatment claims and to
reduce the threat of an unwarranted claim, a threat that can distort
employers' decisions."273
Second, Strauss would require that "every firm employ minori
ties in proportion to their percentage in the national population. "274
Employers would have no cost justification defense to this require
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id.
Id.
Id.
On disparate impact, see supra notes 164-208 and accompanying text.
Strauss, supra note 14, at 1653.
Id. at 1655.
Id.
Id.
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ment, "the sanction for noncompliance 'would be a fine" which
could be paid by employers who found it too costly to meet the
requirements,275 and firms that exceeded the nationwide percent
age would be rewarded. 276 "The objective of this regime is to ac
complish certain social purposes, such as deterring taste-based
discrimination and avoiding racial stratification."277 Conceding that
"the nationwide percentage requirement is counterintuitive,"278
Strauss argued that the potential dislocations would be limited be
cause the sanction for a failure to meet the standard is a fine;279 that
allowing the numerical standard to vary by region would have nega
tive effects;280 and that "variations in the numerical standards based
on qualifications would allow minority employees' lack of qualifica
tions to become barriers to their advancement. The lack of qualifi
cations may be (very surely is, to some extent) the result of past
discrimination, and it contributes to racial stratification. "281
1.

NLRB-Type Screening

First consider Professor Strauss' proposal that discriminatory
treatment claims should be screened in the way that unfair labor
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1656.
It is questionable both because it does not allow for regional variations in
minority population and because it does not allow for variations based on the
number of minority employees with the necessary qualifications. In the end it
may be a poor idea. But there is, I believe, more to be said in its defense than
might at first appear.

Id.
279. Discussing this fine, Strauss noted that the
crucial question, of course, is the size of the exaction from employers who fail
to satisfy the requirement. In principle and at a high level of abstraction, the
fine should reflect the gains to society, net of costs, that result from racially
proportionate hiring and compensation practices. Determining those gains
and costs is of course quite another matter. But at least the inquiry would be
focused in the right place-on the possible gains from combatting discrimina
tion and the amount society is willing to pay to achieve them.
Id. (footnote omitted).
280. Strauss stated:
It might create an incentive for firms to locate in areas with low minority pop
ulation. More important, the problems addressed by the employment discrim
ination laws should be seen as national concerns. An employer can do its part
either by hiring minority employees or by paying a fine. Firms should not be
able to opt out of a national effort to address the problem by locating in areas
where few minorities live.
Id.
281. Id.
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practice claims are screened by the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board").282 Because Professor Strauss would substi
tute the NLRB scheme for the Title VII scheme and would prohibit
private Title VII suits,283 an overview of the NLRB process may be
helpful,284
Generally,285 an unfair labor practice charge alleging a viola
tion of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")286 is filed with
an NLRB regional office. When an employee appears at an office
and indicates that she wishes to file a charge against the employer,
the employee is referred to an NLRB agent (known as the informa
tion officer).287 The agent will discuss the matter with the employee
and will make an initial determination as to a possible violation of
the NLRA. The employee may tell the agent that she was dis
charged and that the employer "unfairly" failed to pay her the
proper amount in her final paycheck. 288 The information officer
will advise the employee that her claim does not fall under the
NLRA, that she may file a charge if she desires, and that the charge
would be promptly dismissed. 289 In most instances, the employee
will not file a charge.
If the information officer determines that an employee's com
plaint involves conduct that may be a violation of the NLRA, the
officer will assist the employee in preparing the formal charge,
thereby initiating the unfair labor practice investigation process. 290
The charge is investigated by an NLRB agent, and the regional di
rector decides whether an unfair labor practice complaint will be
issued against the charged party. If a complaint is issued, the mat
ter is prosecuted by the NLRB General Counsel (by and through
an attorney employed in the particular regional office) and is tried
282. See infra notes 285-308 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
284. Professor Strauss states that he cannot fully defend his proposed arrange
ment, that "the institutional particulars are matters of detail," and that "the specific
institutional details can be worked out, on a trial and error basis if necessary." Strauss,
supra note 14, at 1654.
285. See JULIUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS:
THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1988); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT
ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 7-15 (1976); EDWARD
B. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE ApPRAISAL OF THE NLRB 15-27 (3d ed. 1986).
286. 29 U.S.c. §§ 151-169 (1988).
287. Conferring with an information officer prior to filing an unfair labor practice
charge is not required.
288. See MILLER, supra note 285, at 16.

289.
290.

Id.
Id.
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before an administrative law judge ("AU"). The AU issues a rec
ommended decision and order upholding or dismissing the com
plaint. If no exceptions to the AU's ruling are filed by the parties
or the General Counsel with the NLRB in Washington, D.C., the
NLRB will generally affirm the AU's ruling. If exceptions are
filed, the NLRB will consider the case and will issue a ruling. An
NLRB order finding by the commissin of an unfair labor practice
and ordering the employer to remedy the wrongful action is not
self-executing, and the NLRB must petition a federal court of ap
peals for enforcement of its order.291 Any person aggrieved by an
NLRB order may seek judicial review of the order by filing a peti
tion for review in the courts of appeals. 292
If an unfair labor practice complaint is not issued and a charge
is investigated and dismissed by the NLRB regional office or is
withdrawn by the charging party (over eighty percent of all charges
are disposed of by the regional offices without the issuance of a
formal complaint),293 the rejection of the charge by the regional of
fice may be appealed to the General Counsel in Washington. If
that appeal is denied, the case comes to an end since the General
Counsel's decision not to proceed with a complaint is final and is
not subject to judicial review. 294
Thus, the NLRB process "screens out worthless cases [and]
saves innocent respondents huge amounts of money by shutting off
worthless litigation at the very outset."295 In addition, screening
"may defuse thousands of potentially serious labor disputes each
year."296 For employees, an advantage of the NLRB scheme is that
the government's prosecution of the employee's claim and reliance
on the NLRB's agents in the investigation, settlement, and trial of
the case minimizes the employee's legal costS.297 Thus, employees
who are unable to obtain legal counsel are not for that reason fore
closed from litigating against an employer.
The disadvantages of the NLRB process include the politiciza
291. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988).
292. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988).
293. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 267 (11th
ed. 1991).
294. NLRB v.- United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S.
112,129-30 (1987); Summers, supra note 75, at 476. Section 3(d) of the NLRA provides
that the General Counsel "shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect
of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints." 29 U.S.c. § 153(d) (1988).
295. MILLER, supra note 285, at 15-16.
296. Id. at 16.
297. Summers, supra note 75, at 472-73.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

268

[Vol. 16:219

tion of the NLRB which results from the appointment of NLRB
members who may be more sympathetic to management interests
and concerns than they will be to labor's and individual employees'
concerns and interests,298 and the loss of control of the case given
the General Counsel's exclusive and final authority in deciding
whether to prosecute or dismiss an unfair labor practice charge (re
call that the Title VII plaintiff can file suit even if the EEOC dis
misses her charge).299 Delay is also a concern. In 1980, the time
expended in obtaining enforceable orders in unfair labor practice
proceedings was approximately 1000 days.3°O In fiscal year 1988 the
median time between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge
and NLRB adjudication was 762 days, with an additional 430 days
between the NLRB order and the enforcement of that order by the
courts. 30!
It is not apparent to me that substituting an NLRB-type charge
processing scheme for disparate treatment cases would be more ad
vantageous than the current Title VII process. Both processes can
involve years of litigation. Both processes will require an adminis
trative agency to investigate the claims made and to make a deter
mination regarding the merits of the charge. Unlike the NLRB
process, however, the Title VII process allows the employee to de
cide whether her case will or will not be pursued in federal court
and does not leave that decision to a government agency. While it
is true that the NLRB-like procedure will provide government at
torneys to prosecute the employee's case, that benefit comes with
the cost of relinquishing control and authority over the individual's
claim. Depending on the particular complainant and the particular
case, that trade-off mayor may not be advantageous. In proposing
an NLRB-like model, Professor Strauss notes that "a government
agency decides, on the basis of an informal investigation, whether
the claim has merit."302 The nature of that informal investigation is
critical.
The NLRB conducts timely and swift investigations which
298.
299.

Id. at 475-76.
Id.
COX ET AL., supra note 293, at 266.

300.
301. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOY.
MENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 159 (1993). Professor Gould cites the failure of
the NLRB to establish internal time limits for processing cases and the frequency of the
turnover of NLRB members as some of the factors for the delay in Board adjudication
of cases. Id.
302. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1655.
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must be completed within non-statutory time iargets. 303 Time
targets
are absolutely the most important goal of the NLRB. They de
termine whether agents get retained or promoted, whether su
pervisors, regional directors, and agents get bonuses, and
whether they are on the good or bad list when the region is au
dited. With all this riding on the time targets, it is easy to see that
they are or become the only thing that matters to many NLRB
employees. 304

Generally, NLRB agents must conclude their investigation within
twenty-six days from the time of the filing of an unfair labor prac
tice charge. 305 The agent must obtain affidavits and evidence from
the charging party and that party's witnesses and obtain a response
from the charged party. When a party or witnesses are unavailable
or do not cooperate, the NLRB agent's ability to meet the time
target will be impeded. "It should be easy to see that the short time
target means that agents are tempted to leave issues unexplored
whenever time gets tight. "306
In addition, "the NLRB conducts tens of thousands of investi
gations each year without ever subpoenaing a document. Why?"307
Professor Ellen Dannin has written that she asked that question
and was told that "subpoenas take time to get and time to enforce.
That would cause a problem with meeting time targets. . . . It is
more important to do a fast investigation than to do a thorough
investigation."308 That view of the general lack of thoroughness of
303.

44

See Ellen I. Dannin, Labor Law Reform-Is There a Baby in the Bathwater?,

L.J. 626, 628 (1993).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. Professor Dannin also notes that "until the NLRB Union put a stop to

LAB.

it" supervisors would assign cases to Board agents while the agent was on vacation.
Where the case was assigned at the commencement of a two-week vacation, about one
half of the targeted investigation time would pass before the agent would even learn of
the case and begin the investigation. Id. "Even now, it is not unusual for an agent to
return to the office after several days away to find new cases in their in-boxes with time
already lost." Id.
307. Id. at 629. The NLRA provides that the Board has the power to issue sub
poenas in its investigations or proceedings. 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1988).
308. Dannin, supra note 303, at 629. My own experience as an NLRB agent and
a private practitioner is generally consistent with Professor Dannin's account of time
targets and the non-use of investigative subpoenas. The EEOC is much more aggres
sive with respect to advising a respondent that, if necessary, it will issue a subpoena and
will follow through on that "threat" if the respondent does not comply.
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the NLRB's "informal investigation" should be taken into account
when considering the Strauss proposal.
Strauss also contends that, as a practical matter, disparate
treatment claims "could still be brought as state wrongful discharge
actions, and in employment grievanceproceedings."309 The use of
state wrongful discharge actions310 as a means of redressing em
ployment discrimination would not address Strauss' concern with
reducing the resources expended on disparate treatment claims and
the threats of unwarranted claims. It merely changes the forum in
which those issues will be litigated from the federal courts to state
courts and state administrative agencies. And where a wrongful
discharge cause of action alleges that the challenged employment
action constitutes a tort, the employer may be exposed to even
greater potential liability. Moreover, many state court employment
actions would be preempted by federal labor law311 or state fair
employment laws. 312
Reliance on "employment grievance proceedings"313 raises ad
309. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1655.
310. It is not clear what Strauss means by "state wrongful discharge actions." He
could be referring to state court lawsuits, or to employment discrimination charges filed
with state agencies under state fair employment laws, or both.
311. For example, the National Labor Relations Act preempts conduct that is
arguably prohibited or arguably protected by that statute. San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959). Conduct that is not arguably protected
or prohibited by the NLRA can be preempted where Congress intended such conduct
to be left unregulated so that it could be "controlled by the free play of economic
forces." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140-41 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138,
144 (1971». Other state court employment-related suits may be preempted by § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). Caterpillar Inc. v. Wil
liams, 482 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1987); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481
U.S. 851, 859 (1987). See also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
406-10 (1988) (state court tort suit alleging retaliation for filing a worker's compensa
tion claim is not preempted by § 301).
312. For example, the Illinois Human Rights Act, III. Stat. ch. 775, §§ 1-101 to 10
103, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race and other specified
grounds. That state law also provides that "no court of this state shall have jurisdiction
over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act."
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 775, para. 518-111 (Smith-Hurd 1993). The Illinois Supreme Court
has held that the Human Rights Act preempts all common law tort claims arising in and
out of the employment context. Mein v. Masonite Corp., 485 N.E.2d 312 (Ill. 1985).
Thus, an African-American employee's state court action challenging alleged discrimi
natory conduct would be preempted by the Illinois fair employment law and could not
be maintained in state court.
313. I assume that Professor Strauss is referring to grievance-arbitration proce
dures found in most collective bargaining agreements. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AF
FAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (12th ed. 1989) (98% of collective
bargaining agreements provide for the arbitration of grievances). That type of griev
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ditional concerns. Given the fact that only eleven percent of pri
vate sector employees are unionized,314 almost ninety percent of all
private sector employees would not be able to turn to labor arbitra
tion 315 to challenge any alleged discrimination. 316 Other issues rela
tive to the use of labor arbitration are whether arbitrators may use
positive law external to the labor agreement in resolving a griev
ance,317 the absence of a rule of stare decisis in labor arbitration (so
that arbitrators are not as restrained as courts in their decisionmak
ance arbitration, commonly known as "labor arbitration," should be distinguished from
"employment arbitration," which refers to the use of arbitration in the non-unionized
setting. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurispruden
tial Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1188 (1993). My discussion of the Strauss proposal will
consider both types of arbitration.
314. Malin & Landenson, supra note 313, at 1188 n.3; PAUL C. WEILER, Gov
ERNING TIiE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 9-10
(1990).
315. See supra note 313.
316. It is projected that the percentage of workers belonging to unions in the
United States will decline to five percent by the year 2000. See Ansley, supra note 93, at
1766 and sources cited therein.
317. Whether arbitrators should apply external law in ruling on grievances in ar
bitration has been the subject of a longstanding debate. Professor Bernard Meltzer has
argued that arbitrators should ignore the law and follow the contract. Bernard D. Melt
zer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR,
THE NLRB, AND TIiE COURTS 1 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967). Professor Michael Howlett
has argued that the law must be considered when interpreting the labor agreement.
Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB and the Courts, in THE ARBITRATOR,
THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 67 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967). Professors Robert Mit
tenthal and Michael Sovern have argued that arbitrators should ignore legal rules re
quiring conduct that a labor agreement forbids but should honor statutory provisions
prohibiting conduct that the contract requires "on the grounds that it is worse to order
something illegal than to require some other agency to compel mandated action."
GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 285, at 198; Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in
Arbitration, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION 42 (Charles
M. Rehmeus ed., 1968); Michael I. Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal
Law?, in ARBITRATION AND TIiE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS 29 (Gerald G.
Somers ed., 1970).
Professor Theodore St. Antoine has urged that a labor arbitrator is the parties'
official "reader" of the contract, and is the parties' "joint alter ego" for the purpose of
handling the "anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial agreement." Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enter
prise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977). On that view, "the
arbitrator's award should be treated as though it were a written stipulation by the par
ties setting forth their own definitive construction of the labor contract." Id. Professor
St. Antoine believes that viewing the arbitrator as the official reader "would resolve the
perennial question of what the arbitrator should do when confronted with an irreconcil
able conflict between the parties' agreement and 'the law.' With a right good con
science, he should follow the contract." Id. at 1142. "After all," stated St. Antoine, the
arbitrator "is not responsible for 'enforcing' an illegal or invalid contract. Only courts
can enforce contracts." Id.
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ing),318 and the narrow standard of judicial review of arbitration
awards which precludes the refusal of the courts to enforce an arbi
tration award even when the arbitrator made a mistake of fact or
law. 319
In addition, approximately twenty percent of nonunion busi
nesses have some form of employment arbitration320 procedure for
employees. 321 Thus, as with labor arbitration, the vast majority of
employees do not have access to an alternative dispute resolution
scheme which would replace the private disparate treatment claim
under the Strauss arrangement. The use of employment arbitration
to resolve discrimination claims also raises a fundamental issue con
cerning the privatization of the adjudication of public law and the
use of private "judges" who may decide cases "on the basis of non
legal social mores. "322
Thus, Professor Strauss' proposal that individual disparate
treatment claims could be channelled to "employment grievance
proceedings" does not account for the fact that grievance proceed
ings are not available to most employees. In any event, it is not
readily apparent why employees would give up their right to litigate
their claim (a right which includes the right to discovery and the
possibility of compensatory and punitive damages )323 in exchange
for the opportunity to arbitrate their disputes and statutory claims.

318. FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 374
77 (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1991); Malin & Ladenson, supra note 313, at 1197.
319. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960), the Court made it clear that an arbitrator's award is "legitimate only so long as
it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 597. "[S]o far as
the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no busi
ness overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."
Id. at 599. As to arbitral fact-finding, "improvident, even silly, factfinding ... is hardly a
sufficient basis for disregarding what the .agent appointed by the parties determined to
be the historical facts." United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39
(1987).
.
320. See supra note 313. Employment arbitration was considered and required in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), wherein the Court held
that a securities broker had to arbitrate an age discrimination claim because he had
agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out of his employment when he signed a registra
tion application with the securities exchanges.
321. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 313, at 1188 n.5; David Lewin, Grievance
Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An Empirical Analysis of Usage, Dynamics, and
Outcomes, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823, 824-25 (1990).
322. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 313, at 1189.
323. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Proportional Representation

Professor Strauss proposes that every firm should be required
to employ minorities in proportion to their percentage in the na
tional population. Before turning to some specific concerns about
and objections to the proposal, a brief comment on proportional
representation is in order.
One proponent of proportional representation has contended
that
distributive justice ... requires that individuals be awarded the
positions, advantages, or benefits they would have been awarded
under fair conditions. The argument ... is that only racism, if not
of a direct and tangible sort then of an indirect and subtle sort,
can explain the failure of racial minorities to attain their deserved
proportion of the society's important benefits that they would
have on the basis of their numbers in the society. From that, and
from the assumption that racism is indisputably unfair, it follows
that minorities have the right to claim proportional benefits for
themselves. 324

Thus, goes the argument, "blacks would attain proportional
success in all of society's endeavors if they were not disproportion
ately hindered."325 And proportionality would not be discrimina
tory because it "would naturally occur in a fair world."326 Those
who argue for proportionality work from "the first-order principle
that all people are inherently, randomly equal when it comes to the
distribution of intelligence across racial and ethnic lines."327
Underlying the proportionality principle is a notion of
probabilities and a "way of implementing the legal concept that an
actor's state of mind is revealed through his or her actions, and that
the actor is found to intend the natural and probable consequences
of his or her actions."328 The theory is that if an employer uses
nondiscriminatory practices, over time the work force will reflect
the pool from which workers are selected. A "sharp divergence"
between the racial composition of the work force and the labor
market may lead to the inference or conclusion that an employer
has treated people differently because of their race (or gender or
324. RONALD J. FISCUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LoGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
13 (1992).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 5l.
327. Johnson, supra note 256, at 1043-44.
328. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 63 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
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other protected status).329 Thus, discrimination is seen and defined
as a differential, with the definition resting upon and grounded in a
normative theory of proportional representation. 330 Again, absent
racism and its effects, there would be no differential because society
and the economy would presumably produce a percentage of Afri
can-American workers proportional to the percentage of African
Americans in the United States. 331
Others argue that the proportionality principle is an artificial
concept which cannot withstand scrutiny. Thomas Sowell has writ
ten that "statistical disparities are commonplace among human be
ings."332 In his view, the "even 'representation' of groups chosen as
a baseline for measuring discrimination is a myth rather than an
established fact."333 For Sowell, "the presumption that groups
would be evenly represented in various sectors and levels of society,
in the absence of discrimination, has become a belief almost her
metically sealed off from any logical or empirical argument. "334
The issue, argues Sowell, "is an incremental question of multiple
causation and perhaps policy responses."335
Judge Richard Posner has argued that the ultimate logic of the
proportionality principle
is that the percentage of members of each minority racial and
ethnic group in each desirable occupation, and in each level of
achievement within the occupation, should be raised to equality
with its percentage of the total population (either of the entire
nation or, in some versions, of some region or local area). The
proponents of racial proportional representation do not as yet
urge adoption of the standard at complete proportional equality,
but there seems to be no logical stopping point short of it within
329. Id.
330. HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 120 (199O).
331. Johnson, supra note 256, at 1044; see also GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM &
JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE AcrlON 32 (1991) (arguing for "approximate
statistical parity" and the "achievement of occupational integration throughout the hi
erarchy of employment").
332. THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 19 (1984).
333. Id. "The civil rights vision focuses on groups adversely affected in statistical
disparities. Here the relationship between discrimination and economic, educational,
and other disadvantages is taken as virtually axiomatic. But if this apparently obvious
proposition is taken as a hypothesis to be tested, rather than an axiom to be accepted, a
very different picture emerges." Id.
334. THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC
TIVE 175-76 (1990).
335. THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE & DECISIONS 256 (1980).
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the structure of their argument. . . . If occupational preferences
and abilities are not randomly distributed across all racial and
ethnic groups, then governmental intervention in the labor mar
kets (and in the educational process insofar as it affects occupa
tional choice and success) will have to continue forever to secure
proportional equality in the desirable occupations.336

Professor Walter Williams disputes the notion of proportional
representation and the assumption that all blacks and "[w]hite
ethnics are identical in all occupational [and] income-relevant
ways."337 Arguing that there is no evidence to support that assump
tion, Williams contends that "[b]lacks appear to differ ... from
other ethnic groups in their preferences for sports, entertainment,
music, ... religion," and other activities. 338
Professor Strauss obviously agrees with the proponents of pro
portional representation. In his view, African-American employees
and applicants lack job qualifications compared to whites at least in
part due to discrimination against them as well as their ancestors.
The precise extent to which such wrongs are responsible for any
relative lack of qualifications is impossible to specify. But it is
utterly implausible to say that they are not responsible at all.
The compensatory justice argument is that statistical dis
crimination that cumulatively disadvantages African-Americans
is objectionable because they would not be less qualified were it
not for past wrongs. In a world in which no entitlements had
ever been violated, African-Americans would not be disadvan
taged (at least to the same extent) by statistical discrimination.
Statistical discrimination perpetuates past wrongs; one reason to
prohibit statistical discrimination is to try to restore people to the
position they would have been in were it not for past wrongs. 339

3.

Critique

The Strauss proposal arguably would advance the employment
336. POSNER, supra note 218, at 366-67.
337. Waiter E. Williams, The False Civil Rights VISion, 21 GA. L. REV. 1119, 1127
(1987).
338. Id.; see also SHELBY STEELE, THE CoNTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW
VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 114 (1990) (arguing that affirmative action has pushed
society "toward statistically proportionate racial representation, without any obligation
of proving actual discrimination").
339. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1628-29 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of
compensatory and other categories of justice, see BERNARD R. BOXILL, BLACKS & SO
CIAL JUSTICE 31-44 (Rev. ed. 1992); MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION & Jus
TICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CoNSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 29-42 (1991).
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enhancement purpose of Title VII, eliminate some of the need to
resort to the EEOC or the courts for the purpose of challenging
employment discrimination,340 and more effectively address taste
based discrimination and the effects of past and present discrimina
tion. 341 The actual racial composition of the work force, and not
disparate treatment or disparate impact, would be the factor as
sessed in determining whether the employer had complied with its
fair employment obligations.
What objections and arguments could be made in opposition to
the proposal? First, the proposal would require the nation to admit
that discrimination not only exists, but that it exists in such a way
and to such a degree that proportional representation is necessary.
Such an admission would carry with it the acknowledgement that
discrimination has limited, and continues to limit, the job prospects
of African-Americans, and that current antidiscrimination law does
not effectively address the negative impact of discrimination on the
employment prospects and opportunities of African-Americans. I
am not hopeful that those admissions will be made. It is one thing
to discuss and recognize discrimination at a theoretical or philo
sophicallevel. It is quite another thing to establish a national policy
under which a percentage of jobs must be made available to Afri
can-Americans, especially where there will undoubtedly be dissent
as to the premise that discrimination is still prevalent in this
society.342
.
Second, racial stratification in the workplace would not neces
sarily be addressed if Professor Strauss is only proposing that an
employer's work force must reflect the percentage of African
Americans in the national population, and is not proposing that
specific job classifications within a particular workplace must reflect
that percentage. For example, an employer could reach the per
centage requirement by employing a sufficient number of African
Americans in so-called "lower level" jobs (janitors, laborers, etc.);
in that circumstance, the employer could meet the percentage re
quirement even though there are a few or even no African-Ameri
cans in professional, managerial, technical, or executive positions.
A law firm with a "sufficient" number of African-Americans in its
mail room and among its support staff could claim that it meets the
340. The courts would still have to decide cases brought under the NLRB-type
screening.
341. See supra notes 213-44 and accompanying text.
342. Indeed, some believe that African-Americans have an advantage in this soci
ety. See Walter Shapiro, Unfinished Business, TIME, Aug. 7, 1989, at 12, 14.
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proportional representation requirement even if the firm employed
no, or only a few, African-American attorneys.
Third, it can be anticipated that some will argue that the impo
sition of percentage requirements on each employer constitutes an
improper and illegal "quota." Indeed, by calling for proportional
representation based on the percentage of African-Americans in
the national population, Professor Strauss' proposal goes beyond
the view that with respect to certain jobs the proper and relevant
population is and should be limited to those individuals possessing
the requisite skills and training for the particular job at issue. 343 For
example, it could plausibly be argued that the relevant population
for law firms could be the number of African-Americans who hold
law degrees and have passed a bar examination. Professor Alex
Johnson has noted that although African-Americans comprise thir
teen percent of the population of the United States, African-Ameri
can lawyers represent only about 3.5% of the legal profession. 344
Under the Strauss proposal, a law firm of one hundred lawyers
would have to employ thirteen African-American attorneys, even
where the "relevant population" and availability of African-Ameri
can attorneys would indicate that the firm would be "expected" to
hire three or four African-American lawyers.
Fourth, the speed by which the proportionate requirement
would be achieved would have to be addressed. If an employer's
work force did not contain the required number of African-Ameri
cans, would the employer be required to meet the requirement im
mediately or over a certain period of time? Would an employer
who had not met the requirement be required to hire only African
Americans until the proportionality requirement was met?
Fifth, employers in areas with a low African-American popula
tion would face greater difficulty in employing the national percent
age than would employers in locales with a significant African
American population. Employer A, with a facility in Wyoming or
Idaho or other states with small black populations, would likely ar
343. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1987).
In determining whether an imbalance exists that would justify taking sex or
race into account, a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in
the employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor market or
general population is appropriate in analyzing jobs that require no special ex
pertise . . .. Where a job requires special training, however, the comparison
should be with those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications.
Id. (citations omitted).
344. Johnson, supra note 256, at 1054.
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gue that the absence of African-Americans in its work force was a
function of availability and not of discrimination. 345 Employer B,
with a facility in an area predominantly African-American (for ex
ample, fifty percent), would not violate the law so long as its work
force was twelve to thirteen percent African-American. 346 Under
the Strauss proposal, Employer A would violate the law and would
be subject to a fine; Employer B would not violate the law even
though its work force was not "representative" of the area in which
it operated. 347
Sixth, adoption of the Strauss proposal would require a change
in the established public policy set forth in Title VII which forbids
preferential treatment on account of an imbalance in the em
ployer's work force. 348 Proposals to amend TItle VII to require that
the percentage of African-Americans in an employer's work force
match the percentage of African-Americans in the national popula
tion would certainly be met with anguished howls of quotas, reverse
discrimination, etc., and the political prospects of enacting such leg
islation would, in my view, be next to impossible. 349
Seventh, the Strauss proposal mentions only African-Ameri
cans and does not include other protected groups, people of color,
or women. 350 If the proportional representation principle were ex
tended to include all such groups, an employer's task would be
more complicated.
Having made these points, it must be said that aspects of the
Strauss approach are not unprecedented. Consider the obligations
imposed by law on federal contractors. Executive Order 11246
("Order"), signed by President Lyndon Johnson in September
345. John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil
Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713,1733 (1991).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See Title VII § 7030), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20) (1988). Nothing contained in
Title VII
shall be interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential treat
ment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin of such individual or group ... on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
any race ... in comparison with the total number of percentage of persons of
such race ... in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the avail
able work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
Id.; see BLuMRosEN, supra note 44, at 250-53.
349. On politics and Title VII, see infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
350. Becker, supra note 6, at 1674.
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1965,351 bars discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or na
tional origin by federal contractors. 352 Under the Order and its im
plementing regulations issued and enforced by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP"),353 federal government
agencies are required to include in their contracts with businesses
an equal employment opportunity clause which commits the em
ployer to treat job applicants and employees without regard to their
status and membership in a protected group.354 The Order also re
quires government contractors to take affirmative action (including
written affirmative action programs) to ensure that the nondiscrimi
nation directive is met. 355 Employers who fail to comply with the
requirements of the Order are subject to penalties and sanctions
including debarment. 356
OFCCP regulations provide that an employer covered by the
Order must prepare a utilization analysis and include that analysis
in its affirmative action program. The employer must analyze all
major job groups at covered facilities and consider eight factors in
determining whether minorities or women are currently being un
derutilized (underutilized being defined as "having fewer minorities
or women in a particular job group than would reasonably be ex
pected by their availability").357 Where the analysis reveals un
351. Equal Employment Opportunity, 3 C.F.R. 339-48 (1964-65 Comp.). The
reach of the Order is broad. Apart from governments and educational institutions, one
half of all employees are employed by businesses required to file statements with the
EEOC setting forth the sex, race, and ethnic distribution in the employer's occupational
classifications. Approximately 75% of those employees covered by the reporting re
quirement are employed by federal contractors. See TURNER, supra note 164, at 87;
Finis Welch, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINA
TION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 154 (Steven Shulman & Wil
liam Darity, Jr. eds., 1989).
352. See generally NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN AD
MINISTRATION 115-20 (1988) (outlining the primary OFCCP enforcement tools and at
tempted changes in regulations).
353. Revised Order No. 14, 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1993).
354. TURNER, supra note 164, at 87.
355. Id.
356. Executive Order 11246, §§ 206-208.
357. Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b) (1993). The eight factors for
minority utilization are: (1) the population in the labor area surrounding the facility;
(2) the size of the minority unemployed in the labor area surrounding the facility; (3)
the percentage of the minority work force as compared with the total work force in the
immediate labor area; (4) the general availability of minorities having the requisite
skills in the immediate labor area; (5) the availability of minorities having the requisite
skills in a reasonable recruitment area; (6) the availability of promotable and transfera
ble minorities within the contractor's organization; (7) the existence of training institu
tions capable of training persons in the requisite skills; and (8) the degree of training a
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derutilization, the contractor must develop goals and timetables358
to address the underutilization and must put forth "every good':
faith effort'; to meet the goals and make the overall affirmative ac
tion program work. 359
Although the OFCCP requirements are different from and do
not go as far as the proposal made by Professor Strauss, my point is
that the federal government has put into place and has followed a
regulatory scheme which looks to the number of minorities in a per
tinent population and labor force, measures the employer's compli
ance with equal employment opportunity law by comparing the
number (utilization) of minorities in the employer's work force with
the number of minorities in the relevant population who possess the
requisite skills, and requires the employer to address any underu
tilization in specific job groups and categories through the setting of
goals and timetables and other actions. Thus, a governmental role
and involvement in regulating and promoting the employment of
minorities consistent with some notin of prportionality is not a for
eign or novel idea; indeed, it is an established feature of federal law.
For those who believe that Title VII and other antidiscrimina
tion laws should be interpreted and enforced in a manner that pro
motes some type of proportionality in the employment of African
Americans and other protected groups, the Strauss proposal will be
appealing. The statutory and litigatory focus on the question
whether an employer has engaged in disparate treatment and un
lawful discrimination against an individual would be replaced by a
focus on the question of whether an employer employed a specific
percentage of African-Americans. While the latter question would
appear to be easier to answer than the former inquiry, the Strauss
proposal would require a profound change in currently held and
accepted views of equal employment law and public policy, as well
as the acceptance of a new approach to the question of discrimina
tion in the workplace.

B.

The Bell Proposal

In his most recent book,360 Professor Derrick Bell tells the
contractor is reasonably able to undertake as a means of making all job classes available
to minorities. Id.
358. Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12 (1993).

359.

Id.

360. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM (1992).
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story of the "Racial Preferences Licensing ACt."361 Under that act,
all employers, proprietors of public facilities, and owners and man
agers of dwelling places, homes, and apartments could apply to the
federal government for an expensive license authorizing the license
holder and its managers, agents, and employees "to exclude or sep
arate persons on the basis of race and color."362 Once the license
was obtained, the holder would be required to pay to a government
commission a tax of three percent of the income derived from
whites employed or served, or products sold to whites during each
quarter in which a "racial preference" policy was in effect. 363 Li
cense fees and commissions would be placed in an equality fund
and would be used to underwrite black businesses, to offer no-inter
est mortgage loans for black home buyers, and for scholarships for
black students seeking a college or vocational education. 364
Licenses were to be displayed prominently in a public place,
and businesses operated in accordance with the racially selective
policies set out on the license. No license was available for those
who would hire one black person and then discriminate against
other black applicants; thus, the license could not be used as a
shield against discrimination suits.365
Where a facility was charged with discrimination and did not
hold a license, a charging party would bear the burden of proof and
361. In assessing Professor Bell's story, it is important to know where he is com
ing from.
[B)lack people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those hercu
lean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary "peaks
of progress," short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns
adapt in ways that maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact
that all history verifies. We must acknowledge it, not as a sign of submission,
but as an act of ultimate defiance.
Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted). Bell also assumes that racism is a permanent component
of American life.
The goal of racial equality is, while comforting to many whites, more illusory
than real for blacks. For too long, we have worked for substantive reform,
then settled for weakly worded and poorly enforced legislation, indeterminate
judicial decisions, token government positions, even holidays. I repeat. If we
are to seek new goals for our struggles, we must first reassess the worth of the
racial assumptions on which, without careful thought, we have presumed too
much and relied on too long.
Id. at 13-14.
362. Id. at 48.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 48-49. The equality fund would be administered by a commission com
prised of representatives from, and named by, five civil rights organizations, with each
representative to serve one, nonrenewable three-year term. Id. at 49.
365. Id.
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could meet that burden with statistical and circumstantial evidence,
as well as direct evidence provided by white testers. 366 Successful
complainants would be entitled to damages of ten thousand dollars
per instance of unlicensed discrimination, including attorneys'
fees. 367
In Professor Bell's story, the President made the following
statement at the signing ceremony for the act:
It is time ... to bring hard-headed realism rather than well-inten

tioned idealism to bear on our long-standing racial problems.
Policies adopted because they seemed right have usually failed.
Actions taken to promote justice for blacks have brought injus
tice to whites without appreciably improving the status or stan
dards of living for blacks, particularly for those who most need
the protection those actions were intended to provide.
Within the memories of many of our citizens, this nation has
both affirmed policies of racial segregation and advocated poli
cies of racial integration. Neither approach has been either satis
factory or effective in furthering harmony and domestic
tranquility.368

The President also pointed out that three decades after the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that statute's protective function,
"particularly in the employment area, had been undermined by
both unenthusiastic enforcement and judicial decisions construing
its provisions even more narrowly."369
Bell, through the fictional lawyer-prophet and heroine Geneva
Crenshaw,370 sets out three advantages of the preference licensing
act. First, the authorization of racial discrimination would remove
the element of the compelled association of whites with blacks.
With that element removed, "people who discriminate against
blacks without getting the license authorized by law, may not retain
the unspoken but real public sympathy they now enjoy. They may
be viewed as what they are: law breakers who deserve punish
ment."371 Second, a requirement of publication of discriminator
status and the payment to African-Americans of a price for the
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

370. Geneva Crenshaw was the fictional heroine in Bell's 1987 book on race and
the law. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RA.
CIAL JUSTICE (1987).
371. BELL, supra note 360, at 61.
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right to discriminate "may dilute both the financial and the psycho
logical benefits of racism."372 Racists deny that they are racists, and
few racists "are ready to post their racial preferences on a public
license and [are] even less ready to make direct payments for the
privilege of practicing discrimination."373 Third, African-Ameri
cans would no longer "have to divine" whether an employer or re
altor or proprietor wanted to exclude them. "The license will give
them-and the world-ample notice. Those who seek to discrimi
nate without a license will place their businesses at risk of serious,
even ruinous, penalties. "374
Assuming arguendo that such a Racial Preference Licensing
Act could be enacted into law, would entities apply for the license,
and in what numbers? Applying for and displaying the license en
tails a public admission that an entity discriminates or wishes to re
serve the right to discriminate against African-Americans. Would
the applicant be reluctant to view and identify itself as a discrimina
tor or a racist or a metaracist?375 My guess is that the vast majority
of those who are and who believe that they are discriminators will
not wish to display that fact, while other possible applicants will not
view themselves as discriminators in need of a license.
Columnist Clarence Page has pointed out an example of the
denial of racism. A school district in Aurora, Illinois was charged
with a thrity-year pattern of the following discriminatory treatment:
providing used textbooks to minority schools and new textbooks to
white schools; forced busing of minority students and voluntary
busing of whites; and funneling of white students into "gifted"
classes with classrooms, bathrooms and entrances separate from the
other, primarily minority, students. 376 The lawyer defending the
school district, faced with these facts, did not see racism. In his
words: "Racist to me is a conscious attitude, like running around
with hoods and white sheets."377 Evidently, anything goes in the
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 62.
375. A racist is bigoted and is prejudiced against another person because of the
color of the other person's skin and acts on that prejudice to disadvantage another.
"Metaracism" occurs when "[r)acial degradation continues on a different plane, and
through a different agency: those who participate in it are not racists-that is, they are
not racially prejudiced-but metaracists, because they acquiesce in the larger cultural
order which continues the work of racism." Robinson, supra note 29, at 49 n.133.
376. Clarence Page, Integration Stalls and Nobody Has Any Answers, BIRMING·
HAM NEWS, Feb. 24, 1994, at llA.
377. Id.
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absence of hoods and sheets.
How would an employer covered by the preference act weigh
the costs of the expensive license, the payment of the quarterly tax,
and the possible damages of ten thousand dollars per instance of
discrimination against the probability of a discrimination action and
the prospects of success in the event such a charge is brought? My
guess is that, either consciously or unconsciously, the employer will
act on the basis of its aversion to the risk of litigation. That risk
may be low. As noted above, in anyone year less than one-half of
one percent of all firms covered by Title VII can expect to be
sued. 378 Given those odds and the realities of processing and liti
gating discrimination claims faced by Title VII claimants, an em
ployer may forego the expensive license and choose instead to
vigorously defend against any discrimination action brought against
it. To the extent that many or most employers would make that
choice and not pay for the license, many of the current problems
relative to Title VII would not be eliminated or minimized since,
under both disparate treatment analysis 379 and the licensing act, a
claimant could still be required to prove that the employer engaged
in unlawful discrimination.
Other questions and arguments against the licensing act can be
anticipated. Imagine the probable political response to a law pro
posing to establish another tax and a new government commission
during a time in which tax cuts, balanced budgets, and reinventing
and streamlining government are topics of the day. Imagine the
probable .political response to the payment of commissions into an
equality fund used for African-American businesses, no-interest
mortgages for black home buyers, and scholarships for black stu
dents. Imagine the cries of "reverse discrimination." Imagine the
call for an explication of the reasons why other people of color and
women are not entitled to the same benefit. Imagine the legislative
"debate" over such a law and the sight of politicians scurrying for
political advantage or political cover.
What I cannot imagine is the enactment of such a law. Like
the Strauss proposal, Professor Bell's licensing act would require
the nation to "fess up;" to acknowledge that slavery, apartheid, Jim
Crow, and de facto and de jure discrimination harmed and continue
to adversely affect many African-Americans, and to commit to a
new legal approach and regime of antidiscrimination law. It is my
378.
379.

See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text.
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view that this nation will not agree or commit to such a fundamen
tal change in its discourse on racism.
CONCLUSION

Viewed from the perspective of the statutory goal of opening
employment opportunities for African-Americans, the extant Title
VII regulatory regime is problematic. While it is customary to pres
ent some profound recommendations for a definitive resolution of
the problems, the truth of the matter is that legal scholars have of
fered sundry proposals geared toward "fixing" Title VII, including
changing evidentiary standards, fault theories, procedures, and lia
bility provisions. 38o One scholar has even argued that Title VII is
ineffective because the "Hobbesian foundation [of the statute] de
nies us an ism-free society."381
I am concerned that the hope that Title VII would and will
enhance African-American employment may be unrealistic and un
realized for, as discussed above,382 the current and principal use of
Title VII is to protect the jobs of incumbent workers. Given that
reality, we must ask whether too much faith has been placed in the
legal prohibition against employment discrimination, and "whether
we must be content with laws against employment discrimination
that do little more than protect the rights of employees who have
already found a measure of success in the workplace. "383
Resisting the temptation to restrict this Article to the theoreti
cal, I am also concerned that proposed changes in the regulatory
regime such as those offered by Professors Strauss and Bell will run
into the brick walls labeled "quotas," "reverse discrimination," and
"taxes."384 This is not to say that efforts to address and resolve
380. See Reginald L. Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes's Empirical Natural Law
on Title VII's Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 609 (1993).
381. Id. at 612 (footnote omitted). In the cited article, Professor Reginald Robin
son argues "Title VII cannot rest on Hobbes's empirical natural law and simultaneously
eliminate racial discrimination in employment practices." Id. at 677. In his view, we
should supplant Hobbes's empirical natural law with Hegel's ethical theory. "By so
doing, Title VII advances us toward the full realization of the Ideal in objective reality:
an und fur sich." Id. (footnote omitted).
382. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
383. Rutherglen, supra note 12, at 1479.
384. See generally THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACflON:
THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992) (arguing
that the issues of race, rights, and taxes have intersected with a range of domestic issues,
resulting in a chain reaction in which a new conservative voting majority has replaced
the once-dominant democratic presidential coalition, and that a polarization has pitted
major segments of society against one another).
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problem areas in the regulatory scheme should not be addressed. It
is to say that we must be realistic about, and prepared to deal with,
the fact that there may not be any short-term or long-term pros
pects that Title VII will be interpreted differently than it has been
by the courts in recent cases, or that new legislation embodying al
ternative views will be enacted.385
For four reasons, Title VII will continue to have limited impact
in the area of increasing African-American employment. First,
there is a built-in and real world disincentive to the filing and pur
suit of an EEOC charge by an applicant or employee. An applicant
may not have sufficient information on which to base a charge and
may understandably be more concerned with the search for em
ployment than with instituting an administrative proceeding and
possible litigation. 386 An incumbent employee may choose not to
institute Title VII proceedings against her employer because she
fears that doing so will place a strain on the employment relation
ship and will expose her to retaliation. 387
Second, the statute must be enforced by and in the courts, and
plaintiffs face a host of practical and substantive hurdles as they
seek to prove that their employer engaged in unlawful discrimina
tion. 388 Moreover, Title VII must be interpreted and applied by
federal judges, a majority of whom are Reagan-Bush appointees
and many of whom believe that "Title VII cannot be a significant
agent in removing the vestiges of our long history of racial discrimi
nation."389 As the effectiveness of Title VII is directly tied to the
interpretation of that statute's provisions by the federal judiciary,390
a predominant judicial view that the statute cannot be a significant
agent can result (indeed, has resulted) in a restricted application of
the statute. Although many will argue that the restricted applica
tion is "good" or "bad" from their perspectives, the point is that the
reach of the statute can be limited by the judicial branch. 391
Third, general reliance on the judiciary to apply and enforce
Title VII (or any other antidiscrimination law) presents a set of in
385. Cf Kelman, supra note 13, at 1161.
386. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
389. Culp, supra note 9, at 967.
390. Id. at 970 ("Title VII can be effective in altering the economic position of
black Americans, but its effectiveness is tied to the interpretation of that law by federal
judges. ").
391. Of course, certain Title VII cases can now be tried to a jury. Whether juries
will reach results similar to those reached in bench trials remains to be seen.
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stitutional factors which can limit the efficacy of Title VII. Many
believe that the proper and limited role ofthe judiciary is to resolve
disputes brought to the courts by parties, with the parties present
ing their cases "within well-established, pre-existing legal
frameworks" and arguing "their positions according to rigorously
enforced notions of relevance. "392 In deciding the cases before
them, the courts are to consider only the facts proved and the argu
ments made by the parties. The courts' remedial choices are lim
ited by the absence of the sword or purse393 and, in statutory cases
like Title VII, by the remedial provisions of the statute. It has been
argued that, given institutional limitations, the courts have not
played a major role in the area of civil rights. 394 Professor Gerald
Rosenberg, "finding that the courts contributed little to civil
rights,"395 argues that the combination of "growing civil rights pres
sure from the 1930s, economic changes, the Cold War, population
shifts, electoral concerns, [and] the increase in mass communica
tion ... created the pressure' that led to civil rights."396 On that
view, principal reliance on Title VII and the courts that interpret
and apply the statute (including, of course, the Supreme Court) is
misplaced. 397
Fourth, it must be recognized that Title VII addresses the back
end of a process that began many years earlier. Persons seeking
employment bring with them the advantages and disadvantages, ed
ucation and lack of education, skills and lack of skills that were ac
quired or not acquired in the formative years of their lives. Title
VII will not directly address racism, poverty, and associated social
ills such as an inadequate education, family instability, welfare de
Lillian R. BeVier, Judicial Restraint: An Argument from Institutional Design,
J. L. & PUB. POL. 7, 9 (1994).
393. Id.
392.

17

HARV.

394.

GERALD

N.

ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT

(1991).
395. Id. at 169.
396. Id.
397. Professor Girardeau Spann has argued that the "Supreme Court functions to
perpetuate the subordination of racial minorities in the United States .... For structural
reasons, the institutional role that the Court is destined to play within our constitutional
scheme of government is the role of assuring the continued subordination of racial mi
nority interests." SPANN, supra note 52, at 5. In his view,
a rational minority response to the veiled majoritarian nature of the Supreme
Court would be to abandon efforts to influence the Court and to concentrate
minority political activities on the representative branches, because minorities
are more likely to secure concessions from an overtly political branch of gov
ernment than from a branch whose political dimensions are covert.
Id. at 99.
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pendency, crime, inadequate housing and homelessness. 398 A prin
cipal focus on the back end issues (employment and employment
opportunities) with little or no focus on the front end issues will not
address or change the underlying conditions facing African-Ameri
cans and other disadvantaged persons. Nor will Title VII have any
real impact on the spatial mismatch399 resulting from the movement
of jobs to the suburbs and away from residentially segregated and
hypersegregated African-Americans. 400
As we continue to address and seek answers for the question
of discrimination, we must recognize that the passage of civil rights
legislation in the mid-1960s, while undoubtedly significant, has not
solved (indeed, could not solve) the seemingly intractable and wors
ening economic and social problems faced by many in the African
American community. We must also recognize that Title VII, as
currently written, construed and enforced, cannot reach its lofty
goal of increasing the employment o.f, and employment opportuni
ties available to, African-Americans. Any proposed changes in the
statute must take account of the pitfalls and limitations facing such
proposals. The failure to consider these limitations could result in
the exchange of one set of problems for a different set of statutory
obstacles-again failing to address and resolve the identified ineffi
cacies of the current Title VII regulatory regime.

398. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEG
REGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS, 130-31 (1993).
399. A recent article by Professors Douglass Williams and Richard Sander dis
cussed the "spatial mismatch" theory. That theory posits that "firms have simply
moved ... jobs to the suburbs, and that residential segregation has prevented blacks
from following them." Williams & Sander, supra note 224, at 2020. That theory, first
advanced by John Kain, see John Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and
Metropolitan Decentralization, 82 Q. J. ECON. 175 (1968), notes that as jobs move from
cities .to suburbs, "mass transportation systems failed to provide adequate access for
low-wage workers, and the higher costs of commuting could seriously reduce the attrac
tiveness of low-wage work." Williams & Sander, supra note 224, at 2021:
400. As commentators Massey and Denton note:
residents of hypersegregated neighborhoods necessarily live within a very cir
cumscribed and limited social world. They rarely travel outside of the black
enclave, and most have few friends outside of the ghetto. This lack of connec
tion to the rest of society carries profound costs, because personal contacts
and friendship networks are among the most important means by which peo
ple get jobs. Relatively few job seekers attain employment by responding to
ads or canvassing employers; most people find jobs through friends, relatives,
or neighbors, and frequently they learn of jobs through acquaintances they
know only casually.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 398, at 161 (footnote omitted).

